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Abstract. We introduce derivative sensitivity, an analogue to local sen-
sitivity for continuous functions. We use this notion in an analysis that
determines the amount of noise to be added to the result of a database
query in order to obtain a certain level of differential privacy, and demon-
strate that derivative sensitivity allows us to employ powerful mecha-
nisms from calculus to perform the analysis for a variety of queries. We
have implemented the analyzer and evaluated its efficiency and precision.
We also show the flexibility of derivative sensitivity in specifying the
quantitative privacy notion of the database, as desired by the data owner.
Instead of only using the “number of changed rows” metric, our metrics
can depend on the locations and amounts of changes in a much more
nuanced manner. This will help to make sure that the distance is not
larger than the data owner desires (which would undermine privacy),
thereby encouraging the adoption of differentially private data analysis
mechanisms.
1 Introduction
Differential privacy [8] (DP) is one of the most prominent ways to quantitatively
define privacy losses from releasing derived information about data collections,
and to rigorously argue about the accumulation of these losses in information
processing systems. Differentially private information release mechanisms invari-
ably employ the addition of noise somewhere during the processing, hence reduc-
ing the utility of the result. For specific information processing tasks, or families
of tasks, there exist carefully designed methods to achieve DP with only a little
loss in utility [14]; for some methods, this loss asymptotically approaches zero
as the size of the processed dataset grows [19]. But a general method for making
an information release mechanism differentially private is to add noise of appro-
priate magnitude to the output of this mechanism. This magnitude depends on
the sensitivity of the mechanism — the amount of change of its output when its
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input is changed by a unit amount. This paper is devoted to the study of comput-
ing (or safely approximating) the sensitivity of information release mechanisms
given by their source code.
The definition of the ratio of changes of the outputs and inputs of the infor-
mation release mechanism requires metrics on both of them. For the outputs, we
take the common approach of requiring them to be numeric. In fact, we let the
output of the mechanism to be a single real number, and the distance between
them to be their difference. Our results can be generalized to mechanisms that
output histograms, i.e. tuples of numbers.
The definition of the metric on inputs is a richer question, and really reflects
how the data owner wants to quantify its privacy. DP can be defined with re-
spect to any metric on the set of possible inputs [5]. For database tables and
databases, a common metric has been the number of different rows [18]. But the
data owner may consider different changes in one row of some database table as
different, particularly if it involves some numeric attributes. A small change in
such attribute in a single row may be considered as “small”, and the DP mech-
anism should strive to hide such change. A large change in the same attribute
in a single row may be allowed to be more visible in the output. A change in
geographic coordinates may be defined differently from a change in the length
or the quantity of something. Finally, when several attributes change in a single
row, then there are many reasonable ways of combining their changes (including
summing them up, or taking their maximum) in defining how much the row has
changed. A variety of definitions for the combination of changes is also possible
if several rows change in a table, or several tables change in a database. We note
that for inputs to the information release mechanism, the overestimation of their
distance leads to the underestimation of the amount of noise added to achieve a
certain level of DP. Hence it is crucial to handle a wide range of metrics, from
which the data owner may select the one that he considers to best reflect his
privacy expectations.
In this paper, we show how different metrics on databases can be defined,
and how the sensitivities of queries can be computed with respect of these input
metrics. As queries we support a significant subset of SQL with projections,
filters, joins and also certain types of subqueries, but no intermediate groupings.
The metrics that we support for rows, tables, and databases are ℓp-metrics with
1 ≤ p ≤ ∞, as well as their combinations and compositions, also supporting
the declaration of certain rows or columns as public. Our approach generalizes
and at the same time simplifies the notion of local sensitivity [19], tying it with
the fundamental notions of functional analysis and expanding the kinds of input
data to which it may be applied.
While we consider the theoretical contributions (reported in Sec. 4) of this
paper as the most significant, providing a novel point of view of sensitivity for
information release mechanisms, we also discuss (Sec. 5) a concrete implemen-
tation of this theory in this paper, applying it to SQL workflows. Our analyzer
takes as inputs the description of the database, the description of the metric
on it, the query to be performed, as well as the actual contents of the database
(as required by local sensitivity based approaches), and returns the value of
smoothened derivative sensitivity (our name for the analogue of local sensitiv-
ity, defined in this paper) of this query at this database. The return value can
be used to scale the added noise in order to obtain a certain level of DP. The
analyzer is integrated with the database management system in order to perform
the computations specific to the contents of the database, as described in Sec. 7.
2 Related Work
Differential privacy was introduced by Dwork [8]. PINQ [18] is a worked-out
example of using it for providing privacy-preserving replies to database queries.
In an implementation, our analyzer of SQL queries would occupy the same place
as the PINQ wrapper which analyses LINQ queries and maintains the privacy
budget.
It has been recognized that any metric on the set of possible inputs will give
us a definition of DP with respect to this metric [5,12]. A particular application
of this approach has been the privacy-preserving processing of location data [6].
The personalized differential privacy [11] can also be seen as an instance of using
an arbitrary metric, albeit with a more complex set of distances.
We use norms to state the privacy requirements on input data. Normed
vector spaces have appeared in the DP literature in the context of K-normed
mechanisms [13,3], which extend the one-dimensional and generalize the many-
dimensional Laplace mechanism. These mechanisms are rather different from
our techniques and they do not explore the use of completeness of norms and
differentiability of information release mechanism to find their sensitivity.
Nissim et al. [19] introduce local sensitivity and its smooth upper bounds,
and use them to give differentially private approximations for certain statistical
functions. The local sensitivity of a function is similar to its derivative. This
has been noticed [16], but we are not aware of this similarity being thoroughly
exploited, except perhaps for devising DP machine learning methods [22]. In this
paper, this similarity will play a central role.
A couple of different static approaches for determining sensitivities of SQL
queries or their upper bounds have been proposed. Palamidessi and Stronati [20]
apply abstract interpretation to an SQL query, following its abstract syntax
tree, combining the sensitivities of relational algebra operations (projection and
filter have sensitivity at most 1, set operations have sensitivity at most 2, etc.)
similarly to [10]. Additionally, they track the diameters of the domains of the
values in the outcome of the query; the sensitivity cannot be larger than the
diameter.
The computability of the precise sensitivity of the queries is studied by Ara-
pinis et al. [2]. They identify a subclass of queries (Conjunctive queries with
restricted WHERE-clauses) for which the sensitivity can be precisely determined.
However, they also show that the problem is uncomputable in general. In addi-
tion, they show how functional dependencies and cardinality constraints may be
used to upper-bound sensitivities of join-queries.
Cardinality constraints are also used by Johnson et al. [15] in their abstract
interpretation based approach. For a database, they consider the maximum
frequency of a value of an attribute in one of the tables, maximized over all
databases at most at some distance to the original database, thereby building
on the notion of (smooth) local sensitivity.
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Sensitivity and Differential Privacy
LetX be the set of possible databases. We assume that there is a metric dX(x, x
′)
for x, x′ ∈ X , quantifying the difference between two databases. For example,
we could define dX(x, x
′) = n for two datatables that differ in exactly n rows.
For a set Y , let D(Y ) denote the set of all probability distributions over Y .
For n ∈ N, let [n] denote the set {1, . . . , n}. Let [1,∞] denote the set {x ∈ R |x ≥
1} ∪ {∞}.
Suppose that someone wants to make a query to the database. If the data
is (partially) private, the query output may leak some sensitive information
about the data. Noise can be added to the output to solve this problem. One
possible privacy definition is that the output should be indistinguishable w.r.t.
each individual entry, i.e. if we remove any row from the database, we should
not see much change in the distribution of outputs.
Definition 1 (differential privacy, [8]). Let X be a metric space and f :
X → D(Y ). The mapping f is ε-differentially private if for all (measurable)
Y ′ ⊆ Y , and for all x, x′, where dX(x, x′) = 1, the following inequality holds:
Pr[f(x) ∈ Y ′] ≤ eεPr[f(x′) ∈ Y ′] . (1)
The noise magnitude depends on the difference between the outputs of f . The
more different the outputs are, the more noise we need to add to make them
indistinguishable from each other. This is quantified by the global sensitivity of
f .
Definition 2 (global sensitivity). For f : X → Y , the global sensitivity of f
is GSf = maxx,x′∈X
dY (f(x),f(x
′))
dx(x,x′)
.
Sensitivity is the main tool in arguing the differential privacy of various
information release mechanisms. For mechanisms that add noise to the query
output, this value serves as a parameter for the noise distribution. The noise
will be proportional to GSf . One suitable noise distribution is Lap(
GSf
ε ), where
Lap(λ)(z) ∝ 2λ ·e−|z|/λ. The sampled noise will be sufficient to make the output
of f differentially private, regardless of the input of f .
Differential privacy itself can also be seen as an instance of sensitivity. Indeed,
define the following distance ddp over D(Y ):
ddp(χ, χ
′) = inf{ε ∈ R+ | ∀y ∈ Y : e−εχ′(y) ≤ χ(y) ≤ eεχ′(y)} .
Then a mechanism M from X to Y is ǫ-DP iff it is ǫ-sensitive with respect to
the distances dX on X and ddp on D(Y ).
3.2 Local and Smooth Sensitivity
Our work extends the results [19], which makes use of instance-based additive
noise. Since noise is always added to the output of a query that is applied to
a particular state of the database, and some state may require less noise than
the other, the noise magnitude may depend on the data to which the function
is applied.
Definition 3 (local sensitivity). For f : X → Y and x ∈ X , the local
sensitivity of f at x is LSf (x) = maxx′∈X
dY (f(x),f(x
′))
dx(x,x′)
.
The use of local sensitivity may allow the use of less noise, particularly when
the global sensitivity of f is unbounded. However, LSf(x) may not be directly
used to determine the magnitude of the noise, because this magnitude may itself
leak something about x. To solve this problem, Nissim et al. [19] use a smooth
upper bound on LSf (x). It turns out that such an upper bound is sufficient to
achieve differential privacy for f ; potentially with less noise than determined by
GSf .
Definition 4 (smooth bound). For β > 0, a function S : X → R+ is a
β-smooth upper bound on the local sensitivity of f if it satisfies the following
requirements:
– ∀x ∈ X : S(x) ≥ LSf (x) ;
– ∀x, x′ ∈ X : S(x) ≤ eβ·dX(x,x′)S(x′) .
It has been shown in [19] how to add noise based on the smooth bound on
LSf . The statement that we present in Theorem 1 is based on combination of
Lemma 2.5 and Example 2 of [19].
Definition 5 (generalized Cauchy distribution). For a parameter γ ∈ R+,
γ > 1, the generalized Cauchy distribution GenCauchy(γ) ∈ D(R) is given by
the proportionality
GenCauchy(γ)(x) ∝ 1
1 + |x|γ .
Theorem 1 (local sensitivity noise [19]). Let η be a fresh random variable
sampled according to GenCauchy(γ). Let α = ε4γ and β =
ε
γ . For a function
f : X → R, let S : X → R be a β-smooth upper bound on the local sensitivity
of f . Then the information release mechanism f(x) + S(x)α · η is ε-differentially
private.
3.3 Norms and Banach spaces
First, we recall some basics of Banach space theory. Throughout this paper, we
denote vectors by x, and norms by ‖·‖N , where N in the subscript specifies the
particular norm.
Definition 6 (norm and seminorm). A seminorm is a function ‖·‖ : V → R
from a vector space V , satisfying the following axioms for all x,y ∈ V :
– ‖x‖ ≥ 0;
– ‖αx‖ = |α| · ‖x‖ (implying that ‖0‖ = 0);
– ‖x+ y‖ ≤ ‖x‖+ ‖y‖ (triangle inequality).
Additionally, if ‖x‖ = 0 holds only if x = 0, then ‖·‖ is a norm.
Definition 7 (ℓp-norm). Let Xi ⊆ R, p ∈ [1,∞]. The ℓp norm of x ∈ X1 ×
· · · ×Xn, denoted ‖x‖p is defined as
‖x‖p =
(
n∑
i=1
|xi|p
)1/p
.
For p =∞, ℓ∞ is defined as
‖x‖∞ = limp→∞
(
n∑
i=1
|xi|p
)1/p
=
n
max
i=1
|xi| .
Definition 8 (Banach space). A Banach space is a vector space with a norm
that is complete (i.e. each converging sequence has a limit).
Banach spaces combine metric spaces with distances, which are necessary
for defining differential privacy. The completeness property allows us to define
derivatives. Using the norm of a Banach space, we may generalize the notion of
continuous function from real numbers to Banach spaces.
Definition 9 (Continuous function in Banach space). Let V and W be
Banach spaces, and U ⊂ V an open subset of V . A function f : U →W is called
continuous if
∀ε > 0 : ∃δ > 0 : ‖x− x′‖V ≤ δ =⇒ ‖f(x)− f(x′)‖W ≤ ε .
The notion of the derivative of a function can be also extended to Banach
spaces.
Definition 10 (Fre´chet derivative). Let V and W be Banach spaces, and
U ⊂ V an open subset of V . A function f : U → W is called Fre´chet differen-
tiable at x ∈ U if there exists a bounded linear operator dfx : V → W such that
limh→0
‖f(x+h)−f(x)−dfx(h)‖W
‖h‖V
= 0. Such operator dfx is called Fre´chet derivative
of f at the point x.
The mean value theorem can be generalized to Banach spaces (to a certain
extent).
Theorem 2 (Mean value theorem ( [4], Chapter XII)). Let V and W
be Banach spaces, and U ⊂ V an open subset of V . Let f : U → W , and let
x, x′ ∈ U . Assume that f is defined and is continuous at each point (1− t)x+ tx′
for 0 ≤ t ≤ 1, and differentiable for 0 < t < 1. Then there exists t∗ ∈ (0, 1) such
that
‖f(x)− f(x′)‖W ≤ ‖dfz‖V→W ‖x− x′‖V
for z = (1− t∗)x+ t∗x′, where ‖·‖V→W denotes the norm of operator that maps
from V to W .
3.4 Some properties of ℓp-norms
Let us give several known facts and prove some lemmas that help us in comparing
different norms. The proofs of the lemmas are pushed into App. C, since they
are quite straightforward and follow directly from known properties of norms,
but the lemmas have too specific forms to be cited directly.
Fact 1. For all (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ Rm, p ≥ q, we have
‖x1, . . . , xm‖p ≤ ‖x1, . . . , xm‖q ≤ m1/q−1/p · ‖x1, . . . , xm‖p .
Fact 2. For all x ∈ R+, we have ‖x‖p = x and ‖x‖∞ = x.
Lemma 1. A norm N : Rm → R+ is surjective.
Lemma 2. For all x ∈ R, (α1, . . . , αk) ∈ Rk, (y1, . . . , ym) ∈ Rm:
‖α1 · x, . . . , αk · x, y1, . . . , ym‖p =
∥∥∥∥∥∥ p
√√√√ k∑
i=1
αpi · x, y1, . . . , ym
∥∥∥∥∥∥
p
.
Putting αi = 1 for all i ∈ [n], we get the following corollary.
Corollary 1.
∥∥∥∥∥∥
k︷ ︸︸ ︷
x, . . . , x, y1, . . . , ym
∥∥∥∥∥∥
p
=
∥∥∥ p√k · x, y1, . . . , ym∥∥∥
p
.
Lemma 3. Let x = (x1, . . . , xk) ∈ Rk, y = (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ Rn, z = (z1, . . . , zm) ∈
R
m. If p ≥ q ≥ 1, then
1.
∥∥∥‖x‖q , ‖y‖q , z1, . . . , zm∥∥∥
p
≤
∥∥∥‖x|y‖q , z1, . . . , zm∥∥∥
p
;
2.
∥∥∥‖x‖p , ‖y‖p , z1, . . . , zm∥∥∥
q
≥
∥∥∥‖x|y‖p , z1, . . . , zm∥∥∥
q
;
where x|y denotes concatenation. If p = q, then the inequalities become equalities.
Lemma 4. Let x = (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ Rm, y = (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ Rn, m ≤ n. If
p ≥ q ≥ 1, and there exists an injective mapping f : [m] ֌ [n] such that
|xi| ≤ |yf(i)|, then ‖x1, . . . , xm‖p ≤ ‖y1, . . . , yn‖q.
4 Derivative Sensitivity
In this section, we introduce our new results. We study more precisely the local
sensitivity of continuous functions. It turns out that, instead of estimating the
quantity d(f(x),f(x
′))
d(x,x′) directly, we may use derivative of f to compute the noise
for differential privacy.
4.1 Derivative sensitivity and its properties
We propose constructions that allow us to achieve differential privacy for func-
tions defined over Banach spaces.
Definition 11. Let X be (an open convex subset of) a Banach space. Let f :
X → R. Let f be Fre´chet differentiable at each point of X. The derivative
sensitivity of f is the following mapping from X to R+, where R+ denotes the
set of all non-negative real numbers:
DSf (x) = ‖dfx‖ .
where dfx is the Fre´chet derivative of f at x and ‖dfx‖ is the operator norm of
dfx.
Similarly to the local sensitivity of [19], we will need to find smooth upper
bounds on derivative sensitivity to compute the noise. We extend the definition
of smoothness (Def. 4) to the case where X is any Banach space:
Definition 12. Let p : X → R and β ∈ R. The mapping p is β-smooth, if
p(x) ≤ eβ·‖x′−x‖ · p(x′) for all x,x′ ∈ X.
The next theorem shows how to compute noise for differential privacy. As we
see in the proof, crucial in selecting the amount of noise to be added to f(x) is
the knowledge of a β-smooth upper bound on the derivative sensitivity of f . We
let c denote such a bound. We consider the same noise distributions as in [19].
Noise distributed by generalized Cauchy distribution (Def. 5), weighed by a
smooth upper bound on the derivative sensitivity of f , allows us to achieve ǫ-DP.
Theorem 3. Let γ, b, β ∈ R+, γ > 1. Let ǫ = (γ+1)(b+ β). Let η be a random
variable distributed according to GenCauchy(γ). Let c be a β-smooth upper bound
on DSf for a function f : X → R. Then g(x) = f(x) + c(x)b · η is ǫ-differentially
private.
Proof. Let ddp be defined as in Sec. 3.1. Let η ∼ GenCauchy(γ). The generalized
Cauchy distribution is relatively stable under shifts and stretchings, satisfying
the following inequalities for all
a1, a2, c1, c2 ∈ R [19]:
ddp(a1 + c1 · η, a2 + c1 · η) ≤ (γ + 1) ·
∣∣∣∣a2 − a1c1
∣∣∣∣
ddp(c1 · η, c2 · η) ≤ (γ + 1) ·
∣∣∣∣ln c2c1
∣∣∣∣ .
The combination of these two inequalities gives
ddp(a1 + c1 · η, a2 + c2 · η) ≤ (γ + 1) ·
( |a2 − a1|
max{|c1|, |c2|} +
∣∣∣∣ln c2c1
∣∣∣∣
)
. (2)
Let x,x′ ∈ X . Denote L = ‖x′−x‖. We have to show that ddp(g(x′), g(x)) ≤
ǫL = (γ + 1)(b+ β)L.
We can substitute the definition of g into the left side of the desired inequality
above, and using the inequality (2) and the definition of smoothness, obtain
ddp(g(x), g(x
′)) = ddp(f(x) +
c(x)
b
· η, f(x′) + c(x
′)
b
· η)
≤ (γ + 1) ·
(
b · |f(x
′)− f(x)|
|c(x)| +
∣∣∣∣ln c(x′)c(x)
∣∣∣∣
)
≤ (γ + 1) ·
(
b · |f(x
′)− f(x)|
|c(x)| + βL
)
Unfortunately, we cannot directly bound |f(x′)− f(x)|/|c(x)| with L. In-
stead, we can only claim, using the mean value theorem for Banach spaces and
Fre´chet derivative, that there exists some v in the segment connecting x and x′
satisfying
|f(x′)− f(x)| = |dfv(x′ − x)| ≤ ‖dfv‖ · ‖x′ − x‖ ≤ c(v) · L
where the last inequality is due to c being an upper bound on the derivative
sensitivity of f . However, by using this claim many times, we obtain the necessary
inequality as follows. Let n ∈ N be arbitrary. Let v0 = x, vn = x′, and vi =
n−i
n · x + in · x′, i.e. the values v0, . . . ,vn are evenly distributed in the segment
connecting x to x′. These values are in X because X is convex. Again, the
mean value theorem implies that there exist t1, . . . , tn with ti in the segment
connecting vi−1 to vi, satisfying
|f(vi)− f(vi−1)| = |dfvi(vi − vi−1)| ≤ ‖dfvi‖ · ‖vi − vi−1‖
≤ c(ti) · L
n
≤ eβL/n · c(vi−1) · L
n
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Here the last inequality follows from the β-smoothness
of c. We can use these claims together with the triangle inequality and obtain
ddp(g(x), g(x
′)) ≤
n∑
i=1
ddp(g(vi−1), g(vi)) =
n∑
i=1
ddp(f(vi−1) +
c(vi−1)
b
· η, f(vi) + c(vi)
b
· η) ≤
(γ + 1)
n∑
i=1
(
b · |f(vi)− f(vi−1)||c(vi−1)| +
βL
n
)
≤
(γ + 1)
n∑
i=1
(
b · eβL/n · L
n
+
βL
n
)
= (γ + 1)(beβL/n + β)L .
This inequality holds for any n ∈ N. If n → ∞ then eβL/n → 1 and we obtain
the inequality that we had to show.
4.2 Computing derivative sensitivity
We show how to compute the derivative sensitivity for mappings from certain
Banach spaces. The following lemmas are proven in App. C.
Lemma 5. Let f : Rn → R, and let Rn be equipped with the norm ℓp. Then
‖dfx‖ is the ℓq-norm of the gradient vector ∇f(x), where q = pp−1 (if p = 1 then
q =∞ and vice versa).
The ℓq-norm happens to be the dual norm of the ℓp-norm.
Lemma 6. (a) Let (V1, ‖·‖V1) and (V2, ‖·‖V2) be Banach spaces. Let V = V1×V2.
Let for all (v1, v2) ∈ V ,
‖(v1, v2)‖V = ‖(‖v1‖V1 , ‖v2‖V2)‖p
Then (V, ‖·‖V ) is a Banach space.
(b) Suppose furthermore that a function f : V → R is differentiable at each point
of V . Fix a point v = (v1, v2) ∈ V . Let g : V1 → R be such that g(x1) = f(x1, v2)
and h : V2 → R be such that h(x2) = f(v1, x2). Let c1 = DSg(v1) and c2 =
DSh(v2). Then DSf (v) = ‖(c1, c2)‖q where ‖·‖q is the dual norm of ‖·‖p.
4.3 Composite norms
Lemma 5 and Lemma 6 together give us a construction of a certain class of
norms and Banach spaces over Rn, summarized in Def. 13.
Definition 13 (composite seminorm; variables used by a seminorm).
Let ‖·‖N be a seminorm of the vector space Rn. It is a composite seminorm if
one of the following holds for all x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn:
– There exists i ∈ [n], such that ‖x‖N = |xi|. Such seminorm uses the variable
xi.
– There exists a composite seminorm ‖·‖M and a ∈ R+, such that ‖x‖N =
a · ‖x‖M . The seminorm ‖·‖N uses the same variables as ‖·‖M .
– There exist composite seminorms ‖·‖M1 , . . . , ‖·‖Mk and p ∈ [1,∞], such that
‖x‖N =
∥∥‖x‖M1 , . . . , ‖x‖Mk∥∥p. The seminorm ‖·‖N uses the union of the
variables used by all ‖·‖Mi .
An example of computing derivative sensitivity for a particular function from
a Banach space with composite norm can be found in App. A.1. As next, we
state some simple lemmas that help in comparing different composite norms.
Their proofs can again be found in App. C.
A composite seminorm in Rn can be seen as the semantics of a formal ex-
pression over the variables x1, . . . , xn, where the term constructors are ‖. . .‖p of
any arity. We write N  M for two seminorms N and M , if ‖x‖N ≤ ‖x‖M for
all x ∈ Rn.
Lemma 7. Let N andM be two composite norms over variables x = (x1, . . . , xn),
such that N  M . Let composite seminorms N ′,M ′, V1, . . . , Vm be such, that
N = N ′(V1, . . . , Vm) and M = M
′(V1, . . . , Vm), and Vi are mutually disjoint
w.r.t. variables xj that they use. Then N
′(α1V1, . . . , αmVm) M ′(α1V1, . . . , αmVm)
for any choice of α1, . . . , αm ∈ R+.
Lemma 8. Let x = (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ Rm. Let N be a composite norm, defined
over variables x, such that xi occurs ki times in N . We have ‖α1x1, . . . , αmxm‖p ≤
‖x1, . . . , xm‖N ≤ ‖α1x1, . . . , αmxm‖q, where:
– p is the largest used subnorm of N ;
– q is the smallest used subnorm of N ;
– αi =
p
√∑ki
j=1 αij, where αij is the scaling of the j-th occurrence of xi.
4.4 Smoothing
In Sec. 4.2, we have shown how to compute a valid upper bound on the deriva-
tive sensitivity. We now show how to find a smooth upper bound on the deriva-
tive sensitivity for particular functions. This is similar to finding smooth upper
bounds in [19]. For continuous functions, we have an alternative definition of
β-smoothness, which is easier to use in practice, and implies Def. 12.
For better presentation of the main ideas behind smoothing, we outline es-
sential steps into several lemmas. Their proofs are straightforward and can be
found in App. C.
Lemma 9. Let X be a Banach space. If DSf exists then f : X → R is β-smooth
if
DSf (x)
|f(x)| ≤ β for all x ∈ X.
As a particular instance of Lemma 9, we get that a differentiable function
f : R→ R is β-smooth if
∣∣∣ f ′(x)f(x) ∣∣∣ ≤ β.
Lemma 10. Let f(x) : R → R be βf -smooth, and let g(x) : R → R be βg-
smooth.
1. If f(x), g(x) > 0, then f(x) + g(x) is max(βf , βg)-smooth;
2. f(x) · g(x) is βf + βg-smooth;
3. f(x) / g(x) is βf + βg-smooth.
Lemma 11. Let Xi for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} be Banach spaces, fi : Xi → R. Let
x = (x1, . . . , xn), and let f(x1, . . . , xn) = ‖f1(x1), . . . , fn(xn)‖p. Then ∂f∂xi (x) =
∂fi
∂xi
(xi) ·
(
fi(xi)
f(x)
)p−1
≤ ∂fi∂xi (xi).
Lemma 12. Let Xi for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} be Banach spaces. Let x = (x1, . . . , xn),
and let f(x) = ‖f1(x), . . . , fn(x)‖p. Then ∂f∂xi (x) =
∑n
j=1
(
fj(x)
f(x)
)p−1
· ∂fj∂xi (x).
This can be upper bounded as:
1.
∑n
j=1
∂fj
∂xi
(x);
2. maxnj=1
f(x)
fj(x)
· ∂fj∂xi (x).
Lemma 13. Let Xi for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} be Banach spaces, X =
∏n
i=1Xi. Let
fi : Xi → R be βi-smooth. Then, f(x1, . . . , xn) = ‖f1(x1), . . . , fn(xn)‖p is
‖(βi)ni=1‖p-smooth as well as maxni=1(βi)-smooth, where the norm of X is the
ℓp/(p−1)-combination of the norms of all Xi.
In general, the smoothness is worse if the variables of different fi are not
disjoint. This is shown in the next lemma.
Lemma 14. Let Xi for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} be Banach spaces, X =
∏n
i=1Xi. Let fi :
X → R be βji -smooth for Xj. Let x = (x1, . . . , xn). Then, f(x) = ‖f1(x), . . . , fn(x)‖p
is
∥∥∥(maxj βji )ni=1∥∥∥
p
-smooth.
Lemma 15 (a part of Lemma.2.3 of [19]). Let f : X → R. For β > 0, a
β-smooth upper bound on f is
gf,β = max
x′∈X
(f(x) · e−β·d(x,x′)) .
4.5 Smooth upper bounds of functions and derivatives
We now show how to find β-smooth upper bounds for some particular functions.
For univariate functions, we consider ordinary derivatives overR, where the norm
is the absolute value. For multivariate functions, we can find the derivative w.r.t.
a certain norm that depends on the function, and in general it it is not possible
to compute the derivative over an arbitrary norm. We discuss how to solve this
problem in Sec. 5.2.
To achieve differential privacy, we will also need to find smooth upper bounds
on their derivatives. Suppose we have a function f : Rn → R and want to find β-
smooth upper bounds on both f and DSf . Let us denote them UBf and UBDSf
respectively. Below, we give the smooth upper bounds for certain basic functions
and constructions. These can be composed to a certain extent and some examples
of that can be found in App. B. An example of computing smooth upper bound
on derivative sensitivity for a particular function can be found in App. A.1.
Power function. Let f(x) = xr, r ∈ R+, x > 0. We have
f ′(x)
f(x)
=
rxr−1
xr
=
r
x
∣∣∣ r
x
∣∣∣ ≤ β ⇔ x ≥ |r|
β
For x ≤ rβ , the function f ′(x) achieves its maximum at the point rβ . By Lemma 15,
a β-smooth upper bound on f is
UBf (x) =

x
r if x ≥ rβ
eβx−r
(
r
β
)r
otherwise
If r ≥ 1, we may also find a smooth upper bound on the derivative sensitivity
DSf of f . We have
DSf (x) = |f ′(x)| = |r|xr−1 .
A β-smooth upper bound on DSf is
UBDSf (x) =

rx
r−1 if x ≥ r−1β
reβx−(r−1)
(
r−1
β
)r−1
otherwise
Identity. Let f(x) = x, x ∈ R. Here x may also be negative. By Lemma 15,
a β-smooth upper bound on f is
UBf (x) =
{
|x| if |x| ≥ 1β
eβ|x|−1
β otherwise
The upper bound on DSf (x) is much simpler. We have
DSf (x) = 1 ,
which is trivially β-smooth for any β.
Exponent. Let f(x) = erx, r ∈ R, x ∈ R. We have DSf (x) = |f ′(x)| = |r|erx,
hence:
–
∣∣∣ f ′(x)f(x) ∣∣∣ = rerxerx = r ;
–
∣∣∣ f ′′(x)f(x) ∣∣∣ = r2erxrerx = r.
Thus both f and DSf are β-smooth if |r| ≤ β. Since r is a constant that does
not depend on x, we constrain ourselves to functions that satisfy this conditions,
and for larger r we may just increase β, which in turn increases the noise of
differential privacy.
Sigmoid. Consider the (sigmoid) function σ(x) = e
αx
eαx+1 . This function can
be viewed as a continuous approximation of the indicator function IR+ : R →
{0, 1}, which is less precise for values close to 0, and the error decreases when α
increases. We have:
– σ′(x) = αe
αx
(eαx+1)2 ;
– σ′′(x) = α
2eαx(eαx−1)
(eαx+1)3 ;
–
∣∣∣σ′(x)σ(x) ∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣α · 1eαx+1 ∣∣∣ ≤ α;
–
∣∣∣σ′′(x)σ′(x) ∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣α · eαx−1eαx+1 ∣∣∣ ≤ α.
Thus both σ(x) and DSσ(x) = |σ′(x)| are α-smooth. If we want less DP noise, we
should decrease α, which in turn makes the sigmoid itself less precise, so there
is a tradeoff.
Tauoid. Consider the function τ(x) = 2e−αx+eαx (let us call it a tauoid). This
function can be viewed as a continuous approximation of the indicator function
I{0} : R→ {0, 1}, which works similarly to a sigmoid. We have:
– τ ′(x) = − 2α(eαx−e−αx)(e−αx+eαx)2 = 2α(e
−αx−eαx)
(e−αx+eαx)2 =
2αeαx(1−e2αx)
(1+e2αx)2 ;
–
∣∣∣ τ ′(x)τ(x) ∣∣∣ = |α|·|e−αx−eαx|e−αx+eαx ≤ |α|;
– |τ ′(x)| ≤ 2|α|eαx1+e2αx = 2|α|e−αx+eαx = |α|τ(x) =: UBDSτ (x);
– UB′DSτ (x) = |α|τ ′(x);
–
∣∣∣UB′DSτ (x)UBDSτ (x)
∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣ τ ′(x)τ(x) ∣∣∣ ≤ |α|.
Thus both τ itself and UBDSτ , an upper bound on its derivative sensitivity, are
α-smooth.
An ℓp-norm. Consider the function f(x) = ‖x‖p = (
∑
xpi )
1/p
, x ∈ Rn, x =
(x1, . . . , xn). We have
∂f
∂xi
(x) =
pxp−1i
p (
∑
xpi )
(p−1)/p
=
xp−1i
(
∑
xpi )
(p−1)/p
=
(
xi
‖x‖p
)p−1
.
By Lemma 5, the derivative sensitivity of f in (Rn, ℓp) is
DSf (x) =

∑( xp−1i
(
∑
xpi )
p−1
p
) p
p−1


p−1
p
=
(∑ xpi∑
xpi
) p−1
p
= 1 .
This is constant and thus β-smooth for all β. The function f itself is β-smooth
if 1‖x‖p ≤ β, i.e. if ‖x‖p ≥ 1β . By Lemma 15, a β-smooth upper bound on f is
UBf (x) =
{
‖x‖p if ‖x‖p ≥ 1β
eβ‖x‖p−1
β otherwise
This also holds for p =∞.
The ℓ∞-norm. Let f(x) = ‖x‖∞ = maxi |xi|. We have
∂f
∂xi
(x) =


1 if i = argmaxj |xj |
undefined if argmaxj |xj | is not unique
0 otherwise
The derivative sensitivity of f in (Rn, ℓ∞) is
DSf (x) =
{
1 if argmaxj |xj | is unique
undefined if argmaxj |xj | is not unique
Because we are interested in upper bounds on the derivative sensitivity, we define
DSf (x0) := lim sup
x→x0
DSf (x) = 1
for those x0 for which DSf (x0) is undefined. Thus DSf (x) = 1, which is constant
and β-smooth for all β. The smooth upper bound on the function f itself can
be found similarly to the ℓp-norm case.
Product. Let f :
∏n
i=1Xi → R, f(x1, . . . , xn) =
∏n
i=1 fi(xi) where Xi are
Banach spaces. Let X =
∏n
i=1Xi and x = (x1, . . . , xn). First, suppose that
variables xi are independent. We have
∂f
∂xi
(x) =
∏n
i6=j=1 fj(xj) · f ′i(xi), and∣∣∣ ∂f∂xi (x) · 1f(x) ∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣ f ′i(xi)fi(xi) ∣∣∣, hence:
– If
∣∣∣ f ′i(xi)fi(xi) ∣∣∣ ≤ β, then f is β-smooth w.r.t. xi.
– By Lemmas 5 and 6, ‖dfx‖ =
∥∥∥(∏ni6=j=1 fj(xj) · f ′i(xi))n
i=1
∥∥∥
p
p−1
in (X, ℓp),
so we have
‖dfx‖
|f(x)| =
‖dfx‖
|∏ni=1 fi(xi)| =
∥∥∥∥
(
f ′i(xi)
fi(xi)
)n
i=1
∥∥∥∥
p
p−1
≤ ‖(βi)ni=1‖ p
p−1
,
where βi is the smoothness of fi. Hence, if fi is β-smooth w.r.t. xi for all i,
then f is β-smooth in (X, ℓ1) and nβ-smooth in (X, ℓ∞).
The derivative sensitivity of f w.r.t. xi is ci(x) = DSfi(xi)·
∣∣∣ f(x)fi(xi) ∣∣∣. The derivative
sensitivity of f in (X, ℓp) is, by Lemma 6,
DSf (x) = ‖(c1(x), . . . , cn(x))‖ p
p−1
=
∥∥∥∥
(
DSfi(xi)
|fi(xi)|
)n
i=1
∥∥∥∥
p
p−1
· |f(x)| .
We have ci(x) = DSfi(xi)·
∣∣∣ f(x)fi(xi) ∣∣∣ = DSfi(xi)·∏j 6=i |fj(xj)|. Since∏j 6=i |fj(xj)|
does not depend on xi and DSfi(xi) ≥ 0, by Lemma 10, if DSfi is β-smooth in Xi
then ci(x) is also β-smooth in Xi. Similarly, if fj(xj) is β-smooth, then ci(x) is
also β-smooth in Xj . Hence, if fi and DSfi are β-smooth for all i, by Lemma 14,
DSf is β-smooth in (X, ℓ1) and nβ-smooth in (X, ℓ∞). If DSfi are not all β-
smooth then we can use their β-smooth upper bounds when computing ci. Then
we get a β-smooth upper bound on DSf instead of the actual DSf .
We may also consider the case where the variables xi are fully dependent, i.e.
equal (the case where they are partially dependent is currently not considered).
Consider a function f(x) = g(x) · h(x) where g, h : X → R+ and X is a Banach
space. We have
DSf (x) = g(x) ·DSh(x) + h(x) ·DSg(x) .
By Lemma 10, if g is βg-smooth, h is βh-smooth, DSg is βg′ -smooth, and DSh is
βh′-smooth, then DSf is max(βg + βh′ , βh + βg′)-smooth. The function f itself
is (βg + βh)-smooth.
Sum. Let f :
∏n
i=1Xi → R, f(x1, . . . , xn) =
∑n
i=1 fi(xi) where Xi are
Banach spaces. Let X =
∏n
i=1Xi and x = (x1, . . . , xn). First, suppose that
the variables xi are independent. The derivative sensitivity of f w.r.t. xi is
DSfi(xi). By Lemmas 5 and 6, the derivative sensitivity of f in (X, ℓp) is
DSf (x) = ‖DSf1(x1), . . . ,DSfn(xn)‖ pp−1 .
– Let fi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} (or fi ≤ 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}) and βi-
smooth w.r.t. Xi. Now we have |f(x)| =
∑n
i=1 |fi(xi)| = ‖|fi(xi)|ni=1‖1. By
Lemma 13, f(x) is β := maxi(βi)-sensitive in (X, ℓp). We do not get a good
bound in the case when fi may have different signs, since then fi(x) may
cancel each other out and make f(x) arbitrarily small even if |fi(x)| are
large.
– Let DSfi be βi-smooth for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. By Lemma 13, DSf is ‖(βi)ni=1‖ p
p−1
-
smooth in (X, ℓp), and if all DSfi are β-smooth, then DSf is also β-smooth.
Consider the case where xi are equal: f(x) =
∑n
i=1 gi(x) where gi : X → R
and X is a Banach space. Then
DSf (x) =
n∑
i=1
DSgi(x)
By Lemma 10, if all DSgi are β-smooth then DSf is β-smooth. If all gi are
non-negative and β-smooth then f is β-smooth.
Min / max. Let f :
∏n
i=1Xi → R, f(x1, . . . , xn) = minni=1 fi(xi) where
Xi are Banach spaces (the case with max instead of min is similar). Let X =∏n
i=1Xi and x = (x1, . . . , xn). Let the variables xi be independent.
If for all i, fi is β-smooth in Xi then f is β-smooth in (X, ℓp). The same
holds with max or sum (with non-negative fi) or ℓp′ -norm instead of min.
The derivative sensitivity of f w.r.t. xi is DSfi(xi) if i = argminfi(xi) and 0
otherwise. The derivative sensitivity of f in (X, ℓp) is DSf (x) = DSfi(xi) where
i = argmin fi(xi). In general, DSf is discontinuous at points where argmin fi(xi)
is not unique. One β-smooth (in (X, ℓp)) upper bound on DSf is max ci(xi) where
ci is a β-smooth upper bound on DSfi .
Norm scaling. Let f : X → R in the Banach space (X, ‖·‖). Scaling the
norm by a scales the derivative f ′(x) by 1a while keeping the value of f(x) the
same. Hence, if f is β-smooth in (X, ‖·‖) then it is βa -smooth in (X, a · ‖·‖).
Let c(x) be a β-smooth upper bound on the derivative sensitivity of f at x
in (X, ‖·‖). Then c(x)a is a βa -smooth upper bound on the derivative sensitivity
of f at x in (X, a · ‖·‖).
This construction will be very useful in the cases when we want to compute
the sensitivity of some function w.r.t. a different norm.
Constants. Consider the constant function f(x) = c, f : X → R where X
is a Banach space (with arbitrary norm). Then f is 0-smooth, DSf (x) = 0, and
DSf is also 0-smooth.
Composition with a real function. Let f(x) = h(g(x)), x ∈ X where
g : X → R, h : R→ R and X is a Banach space.
DSf (x) = |h′(g(x))| · DSg(x)
DSf (x)
|f(x)| =
|h′(g(x))|
|h(g(x))| ·DSg(x)
Suppose that h is βh-smooth and DSg(x) ≤ B for all x. Then f is βhB-smooth.
DSDSf (x) = |h′′(g(x))|(DSg(x))2 + |h′(g(x))| ·DSDSg(x)
DSDSf (x)
DSf (x)
=
|h′′(g(x))|
|h′(g(x))| ·DSg(x) +
DSDSg (x)
DSg(x)
By Lemma 10, if h′ is βh′ -smooth, DSg is βg′ -smooth, and DSg(x) ≤ B for all x
then DSf is (βh′B + βg′)-smooth.
5 Application to SQL Queries
In this section, we describe how the theory of Sec. 4 has been applied to SQL
queries. Our theory deals with functions that return a numeric value, so the
query should end up in a single output. Another constraint is that the theory
only supports continuous functions. That is, we consider queries of the form
SELECT aggr expr FROM t1 AS s1,...,tn AS tn WHERE condition ,
where:
– expr is an expression over table columns, computed as a continuous function.
– condition is a boolean expression over predicates P (x) ∈ {x < 0, x = 0},
where x is an expression of the same form as expr. Since all functions have
to be continuous, these predicates are computed using sigmoid and tauoid
functions defined in Sec 4.4.
– aggr ∈ {SUM, COUNT, PRODUCT, MIN, MAX} is implemented using corresponding
functions of Sec. 4.4.
5.1 Banach spaces of databases
Suppose we have a database of n tables. The schema of each table, and its
number of rows are fixed.
Our ultimate goal is to enforce differential privacy w.r.t. a certain component
of a database. A component corresponds to a subset of columns and rows of a
data table. The set of all (sensitive) entries can be viewed as a vector over Rm. By
default, the ℓ∞-norm of all sensitive table entries can be computed, so that com-
puted noise is enough to ensure differential privacy w.r.t. each sensitive entry:
ℓ∞-norm changes by d if any (or all) of its arguments change by d. Alternatively,
it can be reasonable to combine the norm of several columns, e.g. treating the
Euclidean norm of space coordinates as distance. This depends on the data that
the owner actually wants to hide, so we allow to define a customized norm for
each data table. We assume that the components are independent, i.e. if a cer-
tain component’s value has changed, it will not prompt a change in some other
component’s value. The vector of sensitive entries together with the norm forms
a Banach space.
Let Ti = R
ni
i be the Banach space for the i-th table, where ni is the number
of rows in the i-th table and Ri is the Banach space of potential values of a row
of the i-th table. The input contains a tuple of n tables, which is an element of
D = T1 × · · · × Tn. We can make D a Banach space by combining the norms of
Ti using any ℓp-norm. If we take ℓ∞-norm, then we achieve differential privacy
w.r.t. each table Ti at once.
Query without a filter. To make a query on the database, we want to join
those n tables. Consider an input (t1, . . . , tn) ∈ D. Let us first consider the cross
product t = t1×· · ·× tn, i.e. joining without any filters. First, let us assume that
the n joined tables are distinct, i.e. no table is used more than once. Each row
of the cross product is an element of R = R1 × · · · ×Rn, thus t is an element of
T = Rn1···nn .
The query contains an aggregating function f : T → R. All non-sensitive
entries of the data tables are treated as constants. Our analyzer supports the
real-valued functions listed in Sec. 4.4; let us call them basic functions. These
functions are summarized in Table 1, where xi belongs to some Banach space Xi
with norm Ni, and LUB(N1, . . . , Nn) is a norm N such that Ni  N for all i ∈
{1, . . . , n}. The column “Norm” in Table 1 indicates, according to which norm(s)
of T we can “naturally” compute the smooth derivative sensitivity of f . We
allow some more functions, which do not not require any additional smoothness
analysis and are used as syntactic sugar, being reduced to the basic functions.
These functions are given in Table 2.
We can consider t ∈ T as one large table whose number of rows is the product
of the numbers of rows of tables ti ∈ Ti and number of columns is the sum of the
numbers of columns of tables ti ∈ Ti. We can compute the derivative sensitivity
of f w.r.t. the components of t specified by a subset of rows and a subset of
columns of t as follows.
Table 1. Basic functions
Function Variables Norm
may repeat
min(x1, . . . , xn) no ‖N1, . . . , Nn‖p
max(x1, . . . , xn) no ‖N1, . . . , Nn‖p
erx – N
xr (for r ∈ R+) – N
∑
(x1, . . . , xn) no ‖N1, . . . , Nn‖p∏
(x1, . . . , xn) no ‖N1, . . . , Nn‖p∑
(x1, . . . , xn) yes LUB(N1, . . . , Nn)∏
(x1, . . . , xn) yes LUB(N1, . . . , Nn)
‖x1, . . . , xn‖p no ‖N1, . . . , Nn‖p
Table 2. Extended functions
Function Reduction to basic Norm
|x| ‖x‖1 |x|
xr (for r ∈ R−) e−r ln(x) ln(x)
x/y x · e− ln(y) ‖x, ln(y)‖
p
Suppose we want to compute the derivative sensitivity of f w.r.t. a row r of
ti. We can compute the sensitivity w.r.t. the following component of t: the subset
of rows is the set of rows affected by r, i.e. tr = t1×· · ·×ti−1×{r}×ti+1×· · ·×tn,
the subset of columns is the set of columns corresponding to table ti. To perform
the computation, we also need to specify a norm for combining the rows of t.
Because changing r by distance d changes each row of tr by distance d, we must
combine the rows of tr by ℓ∞-distance to ensure that tr also changes by distance
d.
Suppose we now want to compute the sensitivity of f w.r.t. a subset s of rows
of ti. Then the subset of rows affected by s, is ts = t1×· · ·×ti−1×s×ti+1×· · ·×tn.
Each row in ts is affected by exactly one row in s. Let s = r1, . . . , rk and let
ts =
⋃k
j=1 trj where trj is the subset of rows affected by rj . The trj are disjoint.
Let trj = {uj1, . . . , ujmj}. Then the norm for ujm is the same as the norm for rj ,
with the additional columns having zero norm. The norm for trj is computed by
combining the norms for ujm using ℓ∞-norm. The norm for ts is then computed
by combining the norms for trj using the norm that combined the norms of the
rows of ti, i.e. ℓpi .
Query with a filter. A filter that does not depend on sensitive data can
be applied directly to the cross product of the input tables, and we may then
proceed with the query without a filter. A filter that does depend on sensitive
data is treated as a part of the query. It should be treated as a continuous
function, applied in such a way that the the discarded rows would be ignored
by the aggregating function. We combine sigmoids and tauoids to obtain the
approximated value of the indicator σ(xi) ∈ {0, 1}, denoting whether the row xi
satisfies the filter. Let fi be the function applied to the row xi before aggregation.
The value σ(xi) is treated by different aggregators as follows.
– SUM. The values 0 do not affect the sum, so we may compute sum over
fi(xi) · σ(xi).
– COUNT: We may apply the SUM function directly to the output of σ(xi),
counting all entries for which σ(xi) = 1. In this case, we do not use fi at all,
and the sensitivity only depends on the sensitivity of σ.
– PRODUCT: The values discarded by the filter should be mapped to 1, so
that they would not affect the product. The simplest way to do it is to take
σ(xi) ·fi(xi)+ (1−σ(xi)). Here the problem of sigmoid approach is that the
accuracy error grows fast with the number of rows due to multiplication.
– MIN, MAX: We need to map fi(xi) to special values that would be ignored
by these functions. If we take fi(xi) · σ(xi), it will be correct only if all
inputs of MAX have non-negative values, or all inputs of MIN have non-
positive values. In general, we need to map dropped values to maxi f(xi) for
MIN, and mini f(xi) for MAX, doing it only for the rows where σ(xi) = 0,
and keep fi(xi) for the rows where σ(xi) = 1. One possible solution is to
add or subtract the largest difference of any two values ∆(x1, . . . , xn) :=
MAX(f(x1), . . . , f(xn))−MIN(f(x1), . . . , f(xn)), where the MIN and MAX
are now applied to all rows. Instead of applying MIN directly to fi(xi), we
apply it to fi(xi) + (1− σ(xi)) ·∆(x1, . . . , xn). Similarly, we apply MAX to
fi(xi)− (1−σ(xi)) ·∆(x1, . . . , xn). We note that the answer would be wrong
in the case when no rows satisfy the filter. We find it fine, since in that case a
special N/A value should be returned, and the fact that “the answer is N/A”
may itself be sensitive, so uncovering it would in general violate differential
privacy.
If we know that the compared values are integers and hence d(x, x′) ≥ 1 for
x 6= x′, we can do better than use sigmoids or tauoids, defining precise functions:
– x > y ⇐⇒ min(1,max(0, x− y)).
– x = y ⇐⇒ 1−min(1,max(0, |x1− x2|)).
If the filter expression is a complex boolean formula over several conditions, an
important advantage of these functions is that they do not lose precision due to
addition and multiplication.
For real numbers, we may bound the precison and assume e.g. that d(x, x′) ≥
1/k for some k ≥ 1, which allows to use similar functions. The sensitvity of such
comparisons will be k times larger than for integers.
5.2 Query Norm vs Database Norm
In Sec. 4.4, we described how to compute smooth upper bounds on function
sensitivity w.r.t. certain norms. These query norms (denoted Nquery; listed in
the last column of Tables 1 and 2) can be different from the database norm
(denoted Ndb) specified by the data owner. We describe how our analyser solves
this problem, so that the computed sensitivity would not be underestimated,
and the computed noise would be sufficient for differential privacy.
Theorem 3 tells us how to make a function f differentially private, given its
derivative sensitivity DSf . We show that the noise that we get from this theorem
is valid not only for the particular norm w.r.t. which we have computed DSf ,
but also w.r.t. any larger norm. The next theorem is proven in App. C.
Theorem 4. Let γ, b, β ∈ R+, γ > 1. Let ǫ = (γ+1)(b+ β). Let η be a random
variable distributed according to GenCauchy(γ). Let c be a β-smooth upper bound
on DSf w.r.t. norm ‖·‖N for a function f : X → R. Then, g(x) : f(x) + c(x)b · η
is ǫ-differentially private w.r.t. any norm ‖·‖M  ‖·‖N .
By Theorem 4, we do not need to change anything if Nquery  Ndb, as the
noise would be sufficient for differential privacy w.r.t. Ndb (although scaling may
still be useful to reduce the noise). However, we will need to modify the query
if Nquery 6 Ndb. In this section, we describe how to do it without affecting the
output of the initial query.
5.3 Adjusting norms through variable scaling
Let Nquery be a query norm, and let Ndb be a database norm, both defined over
the same variables x1, . . . , xm. As described in Sec. 4.4, we know how to rescale
norms in such a way that Nquery will change while the query itself remains the
same. The main idea behind adjusting the query is to add scalings to Nquery, so
that we eventually getNquery  Ndb. The outline of our methods is the following:
1. Find N ′query  Nquery andN ′db  Ndb, such that there exist α1, . . . , αm ∈ R+
satisfying the inequality
‖α1x1, . . . , αmxm‖N ′query ≤ ‖x1, . . . , xm‖N ′db
for all (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ Rm. Here xi can be norm variables as well as composite
norms over mutually disjoint variables.
2. Apply the scalings α1, . . . , αm to x1, . . . , xm. By Lemma 7,
‖α1x1, . . . , αmxm‖Nquery ≤ ‖α1x1, . . . , αmxm‖N ′query
≤ ‖x1, . . . , xm‖N ′db
≤ ‖x1, . . . , xm‖Ndb .
3. Modify the query in such a way that all norms |xi| are substituted by the
norm αi · |xi|. The norm of this new query is ‖α1x1, . . . , αmxm‖Nquery ≤
‖x1, . . . , xm‖Ndb , so by Theorem 4 we get enough noise for differential pri-
vacy, based on the derivative sensitivity of this new query.
We will show that scaling is always possible for the composite norm if Ndb
contains all the variables that Nquery does. Note that, if there is a variable that
Ndb does not contain, then it cannot be a sensitive variable, and hence it should
be removed also from Nquery, being treated as a constant.
Straightforward scaling First, we describe a straightforward way of finding
the scalings α1, . . . , αm, that always succeeds for composite norms, but is clearly
not optimal. We assume that Ndb contains all the variables that Nquery does.
We assume that all scalings inside the composite norm are pushed directly in
front of variables, which is easy to achieve using the equality α ‖x1, . . . , xn‖ =
‖αx1, . . . , αxn‖.
We use Lemma 8 to construct the intermediate norms N ′query and N
′
db dis-
cussed in Sec. 5.3. Given two norms ‖x1, . . . , xm‖Nquery and ‖x1, . . . , xn‖Ndb ,
such that m ≤ n (i.e. each variable of Nquery is also present in Ndb) we do the
following:
1. Using Lemma 8, find α1, . . . , αm and p such that
‖x1, . . . , xm‖Nquery ≤ ‖α1x1, . . . , αmxm‖p.
2. Using Lemma 8, find β1, . . . , βn and q such that
‖β1x1, . . . , βnxn‖q ≤ ‖x1, . . . , xn‖Ndb.
3. Take γi := min (αi, βi). If p ≤ q, take γ := n1/p−1/q, otherwise γ :=
1. Since Lemma 8 holds for all xi, we have
∥∥∥ γ1α1x1, . . . , γmαmxm∥∥∥Nquery ≤
‖γ1x1, . . . , γmxm‖p.
Since n > m and γi ≤ βi, applying Lemma 4, we get
‖γ1x1, . . . , γmxm‖q ≤ ‖β1x1, . . . , βnxn‖q.
By Fact 1, we get γ · ‖γ1x1, . . . , γmxm‖p ≤ ‖γ1x1, . . . , γmxm‖q. We get that
γ ·
∥∥∥ γ1α1x1, . . . , γmαm xm∥∥∥Nquery ≤ γ ·‖γ1x1, . . . , γmxm‖p ≤ ‖γ1x1, . . . , γmxm‖q ≤
‖β1x1, . . . , βnxn‖q ≤ ‖x1, . . . , xn‖Ndb.
4. Add norm scalings to the initial query: scale each variable xi by γi, and the
entire query by γ.
A more elaborated scaling In Sec. 5.3, we tried to fit all variables under
the same ℓp-norm. This may give us very rough bounds, if there is only a small
subnorm that should be matched in Nquery and Ndb, and the other variables do
not need to be scaled at all.
In our second method, we start comparing two composite norms as terms,
starting from the toplevel operation, gradually going deeper and keeping a record
of additional scalings that may be necessary for some subterms to satisfy the de-
sired inequality. Let x denote atoms of the terms, and vi intermediate subterms.
When comparing Nquery and Ndb, we use the following inequalities:
1. x ≤ x for an atom x, all comparisons finally end up in this base case;
2. v ≤ ‖v1, . . . , vn‖p if v ≤ vi for some i ∈ [n];
3. a · va ≤ b · vb for a, b ∈ R if a ≤ b and va ≤ vb.
4. ‖v1, . . . , vm‖p ≤ ‖w1, . . . , wn‖q if p ≥ q and there is an injective mapping
f : [m]֌ [n] such that |vi| ≤ |wf(i)| for all i ∈ [m] (here we use Fact 1 and
Lemma 4).
Scaling. The check (3) immediately fails if a > b, and (4) fails if p < q. In both
cases it is easy to solve the problem by scaling. In (3), if a > b, then we scale
each variable of va by
b
a , and it suffices to verify va ≤ vb. In (4), if p < q, then
we use Fact 1 and scale each variable of v1, . . . , vm by n
1/q−1/p, and it becomes
sufficient to find the injective map.
Regrouping. It is possible that an injective map does not exist because the
term structure is too complicated. For example, it fails for the norms Nquery =
‖‖x, y‖2 , z‖1 and Ndb = ‖x, y, z‖1, since neither x nor y, taken alone, is at
least as large as ‖x, y‖2. We use Lemma 3 together with Fact 2 to ungroup the
variables and make the matching easier. In this particular example, we have
‖‖x, y‖2 , z‖1 ≤ ‖‖x‖2 , ‖y‖2 , z‖1 = ‖x, y, z‖1.
On the other hand, if the same variable is used multiple times in the norms,
it is possible that there are several possible injective mappings. For example,
if Nquery = ‖‖x, y‖2 , x‖1 and Ndb = ‖‖x, y‖2 , ‖x, y‖3‖1, then the matching
x ≤ ‖x, y‖3 and ‖x, y‖2 ≤ ‖x, y‖2 requires no additional scaling, but x ≤ ‖x, y‖2
and ‖x, y‖2 ≤ ‖x, y‖3 is possible only if we scale x and y with n1/3−1/2. We treat
an injective mapping as a weighted matching in a bipartite graph, where the
terms are vertices, and the ≤ relation forms edges. If any of ≤ relations requires
additional scaling, we assign to it a weight defined by the scaling. We then look
for a minimum-weight perfect matching.
The case of failure. If the subnorms are too complicated, then ungrouping the
variables may still fail to detect similar subterms, and the matching fails. If it
happens, then we apply the solution of Sec. 5.3.
6 How to choose the norm and the ε
In the standard definition of DP, we want that the output would be (sufficiently)
indistinguishable if we add/remove one row to the table. In the new settings,
the notion of unit can be different. If we scale the norm by a and keep noise
level the same, the ǫ will increase proportionally to a. Since there is no standard
definition of “good” ε, it may be unclear which norm is reasonable. For this,
we need to understand what the table attributes mean. For example, if the ship
location is presented in meters, and we want to conceal a change in a kilomter,
we need to scale the location norm by 0.001 to capture a larger change.
To give a better interpretation to ε, we may relate it to other security def-
initions such as guessing probability advantage. Let X ′ ⊆ X be the subset of
inputs for which we consider the attacker guess as “correct” (e.g. he guesses
ship location precisely enough). Let the posterior belief of the adversary be
expressed by the probability distribution Prpost[·]. Let the initial distribution
of X be Prpre[·], and fX the corresponding probability density function, i.e.
Prpre[X
′] =
∫
X′
fX(x)dx for X
′ ⊆ X . We need an upper bound on Prpost[X ′].
The quantity Prpost[X
′] characterizes the knowledge of attacker after see-
ing the output of a differential privacy mechanism Mq. Let X be the random
variable for x ∈ X . We define Prpost[X ′] := Pr[X ∈ X ′ | Mq(X) = y], where
y is the output that the attacker observed. Since the probability weight of a
single element can be 0 in the continuous case, we actually write Prpost[X
′] :=
Pr[X ∈ X ′ | Mq(X) ∈ Y ], where Y ⊆Mq(X) is any subset of outputs to which
y may belong.
Prpost[X
′] = Pr[X ∈ X ′ | Mq(X) ∈ Y ]
=
Pr[X ∈ X ′ ∧Mq(X) ∈ Y ]
Pr[Mq(X) ∈ Y ]
=
∫
X′ Pr[Mq(x′) ∈ Y ]fX(x′)dx′
Pr[Mq(X) ∈ Y ]
=
∫
X′
Pr[Mq(x′) ∈ Y ]fX(x′)dx′∫
X Pr[Mq(x) ∈ Y ]fX(x)dx
=
∫
X′ Pr[Mq(x′) ∈ Y ]fX(x′)dx′∫
X′
Pr[Mq(x) ∈ Y ]fX(x)dx +
∫
X¯′
Pr[Mq(x) ∈ Y ]fX(x)dx
=
1
1 +
∫
X¯′
Pr[Mq(x)∈Y ]fX(x)dx∫
X′
Pr[Mq(x′)∈Y ]fX (x′)dx′
≤ 1
1 +
∫
X′′
Pr[Mq(x)∈Y ]fX (x)dx∫
X′
Pr[Mq(x′)∈Y ]fX (x′)dx′
(∀X ′′ ⊆ X¯ ′) .
Let X ′′ := {x | d(x, x′) ≤ a} for any a ∈ R (e.g. a := maxx∈X d(x, x′)).
Differential privacy gives us
Pr[Mq(x
′)∈Y ]
Pr[Mq(x)∈Y ]
≤ eε·a for all x ∈ X ′′. We get
1
1 +
∫
X′′
Pr[Mq(x)∈Y ]fX (x)dx∫
X′
Pr[Mq(x′)∈Y ]fX(x′)dx′
≤ 1
1 +
e−εa
∫
X′′
fX (x)dx∫
X′
fX (x′)dx′
=
1
1 + e−εa · 1−Prpre[X′′]
Prpre[X′]
.
The optimal value of a depends on the distribution of X. We defer this
research to future work.
Applying this approach to standard DP would give us the probaility of guess-
ing that the record is present in the table. Applying it to component privacy
proposed in this work, we could answer questions like “how likely the attacker
guesses that the location of some ship is within 5 miles from the actual location”.
7 Implementation and Evaluation
7.1 Implementation
Our analyser (available on GitHub) has been implemented in Haskell. As an
input, it takes an SQL query, a database schema, and a description of the
norm w.r.t. which the data owner wants to achieve differential privacy. It re-
turns another query (as a string) that describes the way in which derivative
sensitivity should be computed from a particular database. This new query
represents the function c(x) such that the additive noise would be c(x)b · η for
η ← GenCauchy(γ), according to Theorem 3. In our analyser, γ = 4 is fixed,
and b = ε/(γ +1)− β, where β is a parameter given as an input to the analyser
(by default, β = 0.1), and ε is the desired differential privacy level. The resulting
query can be fed to a database engine to evaluate the sensitivity on particular
data.
The data owner decides which rows of the database are sensitive an which
are not. We assume that each table contains a row ID of unique keys. For each
table X , we expect a table named X sensRows that contains the same column
ID of keys, and another column sensitive of boolean values that tell for each
row whether it is sensitive or not.
7.2 Evaluation
We performed evaluation on 4 x Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-6300U CPU @ 2.40GHz
laptop, Ubuntu 16.04.4 LTS, using PostgreSQL 9.5.12.
We have taken the queries of TCP-H set [1] for benchmarking. Most of these
queries contain GROUP BY constructions and nested aggregating queries that
our analyser does not support. Hence, we had to modify these queries. Instead of
GROUP BY, we have added filtering that chooses one particular group. Theo-
retically, it could be possible to compute the entire GROUP BY query this way,
substituting it with a number of queries, each aggregating one particular group.
However, it would be reasonable only as far as the number of possible groups is
small.
The largest challenge was coming from the filters. The queries that contained
many filterings by sensitive values required increase in β and hence in ε. We had
to manually rewrite the filters in such a way that public filters would be easily
extractable. For example, if we left the filters as they are or even converted them
to CNF form, we may get combinations of public and private filters related by
an OR, so that we can no longer push the public part of the filter into WHERE
clause. Knowing that some OR filters were obviously mutually exclusive, we
replaced (on the analyser level) OR with XOR, which improved sensitivity since
instead of x1 ∨ x2 = x1 + x2 − x1 · x2 we got x1 + x2.
By default, we took ε = 1.0, and β = 0.1. This choice gives b = 0.1, and
the additive noise with 78% probability is below 10 · c(x), where the value 78%
comes from analysing distribution GenCauchy(4.0). Too large value of β makes
b (and hence the noise) larger, and too small β makes the sensitivity larger, so
β is a parameter that could be optimized. For some queries, it was not possible
to achieve smoothness 0.1. In those cases, we took as small β as possible and
increased ε so that we would have b = 0.1 to make the sensitivities easier to
compare.
We have run our analyser on the TCP-H dataset with scale factors 0.1, 0.5,
1.0, denoting how much data is generated for the sample database. For 1.0, the
size of the largest table is ca 6 million rows. The table schema, together with
numbers of rows for different tables, in given in App. D.1. We have considered
integer, decimal, and date columns of these tables as sensitive, assigning to them
different weights, described more precisely in App. D.2. Sensitive entries have
been combined using an ℓ1-norm.
We adjusted (as described above) the queries Q1 (splitting it to 5 queries),
Q3−Q7, Q9−Q10, Q12 (splitting it to 2 queries), Q16, Q17, Q19 of the TCP-H
dataset to our analyser. The queries on which we actually ran the analysis can be
found in App. D.3. The time benchmarks can be found in Table 3, and precision
in Table 4, where K denotes ·103,M denotes ·106, and G denotes ·109. The time
spent to generate the query that computes sensitivity is negligible (below 20ms),
as it does not depend on the number of rows, so we only report the time spent
to execute that query. In addition to the initial query and the sensitivity, we
have also measured time and output the modified query, where private filtering
is replaced with continuous approximation (sigmoids). The reason is that the
sensitivity has been computed for the modified query, and it does not guarantee
differential privacy if we add noise to the output of the initial query. The error has
been computed as the ratio between the actual result and the difference between
the actual and the private results, which is |(mod.res+10·sens)−init.res|init.res · 100.
The worst precision is achieved for the queries that use several filters over
sensitive values. While b4 and b5 are similar queries, in b4 the filtering aims
to capture a 3-unit span, while it is a 12-unit span in b5, and sigmoids better
distinguish values that are further apart. When the two corresponding sigmoids
are multiplied, the function gets too low-scaled in the short span. The result
seems especially bad for b10, where no rows satisfy the filtering in the real query
and the correct answer should be 0.0, but the small errors of single rows aggregate
too much for large tables. The error would not seem so large if compared to the
result that we would get if all rows actually satisfied the filter, and for sparse
filtering the relative error will be larger than for dense filtering.
The time overhead is also larger for queries with multiple sensitive filters,
not only because the query itself becomes longer and requires computation of
exponent functions, but mainly since the sensitive filters are no longer a part of
WHERE clause, and the modified query function needs to be applied to more
rows.
8 Limitations and Future Work
Our analyser supports queries only of certain form. In particular, it does not
support DISTINCT queries. The problems is that, to use derivative sensitivity,
we need to use continuous functions in the queries. We do not know how to
approximate efficiently a function that removes repeating elements from a list
of arguments. Support of GROUP BY queries is limited, allowing grouping only
by a non-sensitive attribute, or an attribute whose range is known to be small,
since we only protect real-valued outputs, and not the number of outputs.
From the evaluation results, we see that that using numerous filters over
sensitive values makes the error high. Clearly, adding noise before filtering is
the path towards smaller errors. While we believe that the derivative sensitivity
SF = 0.1 SF = 0.5 SF = 1.0
init.query mod.query sens. init.query mod.query sens. init.query mod.query sens.
b1 1 205.61 5.83K 15.97K 919.07 29.49K 80.69K 1.76K 57.13K 155.34K
b1 2 180.87 5.72K 16.12K 883.25 29.47K 87.0K 1.78K 56.7K 155.42K
b1 3 191.4 5.8K 16.54K 1.07K 29.08K 83.59K 1.88K 55.67K 158.74K
b1 4 196.88 5.91K 17.25K 1.02K 28.55K 81.27K 1.91K 56.64K 159.98K
b1 5 177.97 5.75K 5.82K 1.0K 28.91K 29.62K 1.72K 55.23K 57.13K
b3 176.42 137.24 473.92 1.03K 722.25 2.44K 337.31 486.79 1.11K
b4 239.58 9.82K 33.35K 1.18K 46.5K 168.3K 2.16K 92.54K 332.54K
b5 139.85 304.15 2.55K 1.02K 1.06K 4.73K 1.48K 2.16K 10.65K
b6 156.01 38.64K 199.75K 795.69 188.32K 946.76K 1.5K 375.49K 1.86M
b7 190.33 325.91 1.23K 999.83 1.4K 6.01K 2.0K 3.07K 12.68K
b9 190.48 169.74 6.27K 856.59 800.38 4.81K 1.76K 1.67K 10.25K
b10 168.22 174.9 588.18 943.38 917.2 3.03K 319.81 1.78K 5.86K
b12 1 250.2 16.92K 79.13K 1.39K 87.39K 391.23K 2.79K 163.11K 787.36K
b12 2 232.81 7.03K 32.49K 1.25K 36.13K 163.06K 2.39K 67.93K 312.06K
b16 19.02 214.31 476.22 101.77 1.22K 2.8K 210.06 2.27K 5.96K
b17 120.45 111.22 312.88 722.6 585.05 1.69K 1.18K 1.17K 3.24K
b19 165.74 332.22 1.62K 933.98 1.76K 8.47K 1.74K 3.6K 16.02K
Table 3. Time benchmarks (ms)
SF = 0.1 SF = 0.5 SF = 1.0
ε init.res mod.res sens. % error init.res mod.res sens. % error init.res mod.res sens. % error
b1 1 1.0 3.79M 3.55M 1.0 6.18 18.87M 17.7M 1.0 6.2 37.72M 35.38M 1.0 6.2
b1 2 1.0 5.34G 5.01G 9.96K 6.18 27.35G 25.65G 9.96K 6.2 56.57G 53.06G 9.96K 6.2
b1 3 1.0 5.07G 4.76G 11.16K 6.18 25.98G 24.37G 11.16K 6.2 53.74G 50.41G 11.16K 6.2
b1 4 1.0 5.27G 4.95G 12.06K 6.18 27.02G 25.34G 12.06K 6.2 55.89G 52.43G 12.06K 6.2
b1 5 1.0 148.3K 139.12K 0.0006 6.19 739.56K 693.7K 0.0006 6.2 1.48M 1.39M 0.0006 6.2
b3 1.0 3.62K 1.09K 7.98K 2.13K 3.21K 963.25 7.98K 2.42K 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
b4 1.0 2.92K 8.58K 0.0068 194.14 14.17K 42.89K 0.0069 202.66 28.07K 85.67K 0.0069 205.18
b5 1.0 5.43M 5.05M 4.96K 5.98 25.28M 23.82M 4.96K 5.56 47.56M 45.33M 4.96K 4.6
b6 8.5 17.45M 17.09M 192.5K 9.03 88.13M 87.69M 196.87K 1.74 181.93M 181.41M 201.81K 0.82
b7 1.0 22.07M 22.12M 22.25K 1.24 95.63M 100.99M 22.51K 5.85 212.11M 219.31M 22.58K 3.5
b9 1.0 30.32M 30.32M 40.0K 1.32 137.73M 137.73M 49.2K 0.36 283.82M 283.82M 49.2K 0.17
b10 1.0 100.31K 111.39K 3.42K 45.15 149.6K 175.47K 3.42K 40.18 0.0 93.54K 3.31K ∞
b12 1 1.0 3.12K 9.05K 0.0041 190.47 15.41K 45.15K 0.0041 193.04 30.84K 90.3K 0.0041 192.83
b12 2 1.0 1.29K 3.65K 0.0041 183.08 6.2K 18.11K 0.0041 191.85 12.37K 36.24K 0.0041 193.01
b16 4.5 4.94K 249.44K 16.69 4.95K 24.51K 1.25M 16.69 5.01K 49.01K 2.51M 16.69 5.02K
b17 1.0 31.54K 265.49K 902.59 770.26 256.24K 1.61M 902.59 531.72 531.93K 3.53M 902.59 565.73
b19 7.0 155.25K 207.81K 27.0K 207.74 1.1M 1.17M 28.23K 31.52 1.73M 2.3M 29.8K 50.84
Table 4. Precision benchmarks
framework allows us to locate the points where the noise has to be added, and
to determine its magnitude, this is not the topic of the current paper.
9 Conclusion
We have started the study of complete norms to define the quantitative privacy
properties of information release mechanisms, and have discovered their high
expressivity for different kinds of numeric inputs, as well as the principles of
the parallel composition of norms in a manner that allows the sensitivity of the
information release mechanism to be found. Our results show how the similarity
of local sensitivity and the derivative can be exploited in constructing differen-
tially private mechanisms. The result is also practically significant because of
the need to precisely model the privacy requirements of data owner(s), for which
the flexibility of specifying the metric over possible inputs is a must.
Our results open up the study of the combinations of metrics over more varied
types of input data, including categorical data, structured data or data with
consistency constraints. Such study would also look for possibilities to express
the constraints through suitable combinations of metrics over components. We
note that inputs with constraints [17] or with particular structure (sequences
indexed by time points) [9,7] have been considered in the literature. Our hope is
that it is possible to find suitable complete norms that define the metrics that
have been used in the privacy definitions for such data, and thereby express
these constructions inside our framework.
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A Example
A.1 Computing derivative sensitivity w.r.t. different components
Consider the example of computing differentially privately the time that a ship
takes to reach the port. This time can be expressed as
f(x, y, v) =
√
x2 + y2
v
f : R3 → R
where (x, y) are the coordinates of the ship (with the port at (0, 0)) and v is the
speed of the ship. For differential privacy, we need to define distances on R3 and
R. Because we want to use Fre´chet derivatives to compute the sensitivities, we
instead define norms, which then also induce distances. For R it is natural to
use the absolute value norm but for R3 there are more choices.
Consider the ℓ1-distance that we used previously. Then moving the ship by
geographical distance s in a direction parallel or perpendicular to its velocity,
changes the whole input by ℓ1-distance s. But moving the ship in any other
direction changes the whole input by ℓ1-distance more than s. This is unnatural.
We would like the change not to depend on the direction.
Consider the ℓ2-distance. Then moving the ship by geographical distance s
always changes the whole input by ℓ2-distance s, regardless of direction. If we
change the speed of the ship by u (either up or down) then the whole input
changes by ℓ2-distance u. If we simultaneously move the ship by distance s and
change its speed by u however, and numerically s = u (ignoring the units) then
the whole input changes by ℓ2-distance
√
2 · s instead of the more natural 2s.
Thus it is better to combine ℓ1- and ℓ2-distances. We first combine the change
in the coordinates of the ship using ℓ1-norm, then combine the result with the
change in speed using ℓ2-norm. Thus
‖(∆x,∆y,∆v)‖ = ‖(‖(∆x,∆y)‖2, ∆v)‖1 =
√
(∆x)2 + (∆y)2 + |∆v|
This still has a problem. Suppose that x = y = 2000 km, v = 20 km/h. Then
changing v to 10 km/h changes the whole input by the same distance as changing
y to 2010 km. But the former change seems much more important in most cases
than the latter. Thus we scale the geographical change and the speed change by
different constants before combining them:
‖(∆x,∆y,∆v)‖ = a
√
(∆x)2 + (∆y)2 + b|∆v| = ‖(‖(a∆x, a∆y)‖2, b∆v)‖1
This norm should now be good enough.
Let us now compute the derivatives. We first compute ordinary partial deriva-
tives, i.e. with respect to the absolute value norm.
∂f
∂x
=
2x
2v
√
x2 + y2
=
x
v
√
x2 + y2
∂f
∂y
=
2y
2v
√
x2 + y2
=
y
v
√
x2 + y2
∂f
∂v
= −
√
x2 + y2
v2
Now we compute the derivatives w.r.t. the scaled one-dimensional norms, i.e. x
is considered not as an element of the Banach space (R, | |) but as an element
of the Banach space (R, ‖ ‖x) where ‖∆x‖x = a|∆x|. The operator norm of the
Fre´chet derivative in (R, ‖ ‖x) (which is also the derivative sensitivity) is then
DSfy,v (x) = ‖dfy,vx ‖ =
∣∣∣∣ ∂fa∂x
∣∣∣∣ = |x|
a|v|
√
x2 + y2
where fy,v is the one-variable function defined by fy,v(x) = f(x, y, v), i.e. y and
v are considered as constants. Similarly, we compute
DSfx,v(y) = ‖dfx,vy ‖ =
∣∣∣∣ ∂fa∂y
∣∣∣∣ = |y|
a|v|
√
x2 + y2
DSfx,y (v) = ‖dfx,yv ‖ =
∣∣∣∣ ∂fb∂v
∣∣∣∣ =
√
x2 + y2
bv2
where fx,v and fx,y are the one-variable functions defined by fx,v(y) = f(x, y, v)
and fx,y(v) = f(x, y, v).
Now we use Lemma 6 to combine the Banach spaces (R, ‖ ‖x) and (R, ‖ ‖y)
into the Banach space (R2, ‖ ‖xy) where
‖(∆x,∆y)‖xy = ‖(‖∆x‖x, ‖∆y‖y)‖2 = ‖(a∆x, a∆y)‖2
We get
‖dfv(x,y)‖ = DSfv(x, y) = ‖(DSfy,v (x),DSfx,v (y))‖2 =
√
2
a|v|
Now we again use Lemma 6 to combine the Banach spaces (R2, ‖ ‖xy) and
(R, ‖ ‖v) into the Banach space (R2, ‖ ‖xyv) where
‖(∆x,∆y,∆v)‖xyz = a
√
(∆x)2 + (∆y)2 + b|∆v| = ‖(‖(a∆x, a∆y)‖2, b∆v)‖1
We get
‖df(x,y,v)‖ = DSf (x, y, v) = ‖(DSfv (x, y),DSfx,y (v))‖∞ =
= max
( √
2
a|v| ,
√
x2 + y2
bv2
)
Thus we have found not only the derivative sensitivity of f (DSf ), but also its
derivative sensitivities w.r.t. components (partial derivatives DSfy,v ,DSfx,v ,DSfx,y ,DSfv ).
The sensitivities w.r.t. components depend on other components but this is not
a problem because when computing f(x, y, v) differentially privately, even w.r.t.
a component, we need to use all of x, y, v anyway, so why not use all this infor-
mation for computing the noise level too.
To achieve differential privacy, we need to find a smooth upper bound on the
derivative sensitivity. When differential privacy is required only w.r.t. a compo-
nent then the sensitivity w.r.t. to the component only needs to be smoothed for
changes in that component (changes in other components are allowed to change
the smooth upper bound without smoothness restriction).
After a smooth upper bound has been found, we can use Theorem 3 to
compute f differentially privately.
Finding a smooth upper bound Consider the example of computing differ-
entially privately the time it takes for the next ship to reach the port. This time
can be expressed as
f(x1, y1, v1, . . . , xn, yn, vn) =
n
min
i=1
√
x2i + y
2
i
vi
f : R3n → R
where (xi, yi) are the coordinates of the i
th ship (with the port at (0, 0)) and vi
is its speed.
Note that vi is in the power −1 and we do not know how to find the smooth
derivative sensitivity of the function fv,i(vi) = v
−1
i (we only know how to do it
for power functions with exponent ≥ 1). Let us define wi = ζ ln vi. The coefficient
ζ is used to control the distance by which the whole input vector changes if ln vi
is changed by 1. Similarly, we add a coefficient to the geographical coordinates:
si = αxi, ti = αyi. Then we consider (s1, t1, w1, . . . , sn, tn, wn) as an element of
the Banach space (R3n, ‖ ‖) where
‖(s1, t1, w1, . . . , sn, tn, wn)‖ =
= ‖(‖(‖(s1, t1)‖2, w1)‖1, . . . , ‖(‖(sn, tn)‖2, wn)‖1)‖p
Then vi = e
wi/ζ , xi =
si
α , yi =
ti
α and
g(s1, t1, w1, . . . , sn, tn, wn) =
1
α
n
min
i=1
√
s2i + t
2
i
ewi/ζ
Now the derivative sensitivity of gw,i(wi) = e
−wi/ζ is
DSgw,i(wi) =
1
ζ
e−wi/ζ
which is 1ζ -smooth. The function gw,i itself is also
1
ζ -smooth.
The derivative sensitivity of gst,i(si, ti) =
√
s2i + t
2
i in (R
2, ℓ2) is
DSgst,i(si, ti) = 1
which is β-smooth for all β. The function gst,i is
1
ζ -smooth if
1√
s2i+t
2
i
≤ 1ζ , i.e. if√
s2i + t
2
i ≥ ζ. A 1ζ -smooth upper bound on gst,i is
gˆst,i(si, ti) =


√
s2i + t
2
i if
√
s2i + t
2
i ≥ ζ
ζe
√
s2
i
+t2
i
ζ −1 otherwise
An upper bound on the derivative sensitivity of gi(si, ti, wi) =
√
s2i+t
2
i
ewi/ζ
is
cgi(si, ti, wi) =
∥∥(DSgst,i(si, ti) · gw,i(wi),DSgw,i(wi) · gˆst,i(si, ti))∥∥∞ =
=
∥∥∥∥
(
1 · e−wi/ζ , 1
ζ
e−wi/ζ · gˆst,i(si, ti)
)∥∥∥∥
∞
=
max
(
1,
gˆst,i(si,ti)
ζ
)
ewi/ζ
and it is 1ζ -smooth because DSgw,i(wi), DSgst,i , gw,i(wi), and gˆst,i(si, ti)) are
1
ζ -smooth.
A 1ζ -smooth upper bound on DSg is
c(u) =
1
α
max
i
cgi(si, ti, wi) =
1
α
max
i
max
(
1,
gˆst,i(si,ti))
ζ
)
ewi/ζ
where u = (s1, t1, w1, . . . , sn, tn, wn).
Now we can use Theorem 3 to compute an ǫ-differentially private version of
g:
h(u) = g(u) +
c(u)
b
· η
ǫ = (γ + 1)(b+
1
ζ
)
γ > 1, b > 0, η ∼ GenCauchy(γ)
To compute an ǫ-differentially private version of f , we first transform (x1, y1, v1, . . . , xn, yn, vn)
into u and then compute h(u).
B Sensitivities of some particular functions
We show how to find smooth upper bounds on derivatives of composite functions,
whose non-composite versions have been considered in Sec. 4.4.
Composite power function. Let f(x) = (g(x))r , r ≥ 1 where g : X → R+
and X is a Banach space. We have
DSf (x) = |r|(g(x))r−1 ·DSg(x) .
If g is β1-smooth and DSg is β2-smooth then, by Lemma 10, DSf is (|r−1|β1+β2)-
smooth. The function f itself is β-smooth where
β = sup
x
|r|(g(x))r−1 ·DSg(x)
(g(x))r
= |r| · sup
x
DSg(x)
g(x)
= |r|β1 .
This can be extended to r < 1 if g itself is β1-smooth, not only its upper bound.
For r ≥ 1, if g¯ is a β1-smooth upper bound on g then
r · (g¯(x))r−1 ·DSg(x)
is a (|r − 1|β1 + β2)-smooth upper bound on DSf .
Composite exponent. Let f(x) = er·g(x), r ∈ R, x ∈ X where g : X → R
and X is a Banach space. We have
DSf (x) = |r|er·g(x) ·DSg(x) ;
DSf (x)
|f(x)| = |r| ·DSg(x) .
Suppose that DSg(x) ≤ B for all x. Then f is |r|B-smooth.
DSDSf (x) = |r|DSf (x)DSg(x) + |r|er·g(x) ·DSDSg (x) ;
DSDSf (x)
DSf (x)
= |r| ·DSg(x) +
DSDSg (x)
DSg(x)
.
If DSg(x) ≤ B for all x (i.e. B is a 0-smooth upper bound on DSg(x)) and
DSg(x) is β2-smooth then f is (|r|B + β2)-smooth by Lemma 10.
Composite sigmoid and tauoid. The composition with a real function
of Sec. 4.4 can be combined with the derivative sensitivities of a sigmoid and a
tauoid to get a smooth derivative sensitivity for the functions f1(x) = σ(g(x))
and f2(x) = τ(g(x)) where g : X → R, X is a Banach space, and DSg(x) ≤ B
for all x.
Composite product. Consider a function f(x) =
∏n
i=1 gi(x) where gi :
X → R and X is a Banach space. We have
DSf (x) =
n∑
i=1
DSgi(x) ·
∏
j 6=i
|gj(x)| =
n∑
i=1
DSgi(x) ·
∣∣∣∣ f(x)gi(x)
∣∣∣∣
= |f(x)| ·
n∑
i=1
DSgi(x)
|gi(x)| .
By Lemma 10, if gi is βi-smooth and DSgi is β
′
i-smooth then f is (
∑
i βi)-smooth,
and DSf is maxi(β
′
i+
∑
j 6=i βj)-smooth. As we see, the smoothness guarantees of
f and DSf are much worse than in the case where the variables are independent.
Composite ℓp-norm. Let f :
∏n
i=1Xi → R, f(x1, . . . , xn) = ‖(f1(x1), . . . , fn(xn)‖p
where Xi are Banach spaces. Let X =
∏n
i=1Xi and x = (x1, . . . , xn). Let
yi = fi(xi) and y = (y1, . . . , yn). The derivative sensitivity of f w.r.t. xi is
ci(x) =
∂f
∂yi
(y) ·DSfi(xi) =
(
yi
‖y‖p
)p−1
·DSfi(xi)
The derivative sensitivity of f in (X, ℓp′) is
DSf (x) = ‖(c1(x), . . . , cn(x))‖q′ .
Note that (
yi
‖y‖p
)p−1
≤ 1 .
Thus a β-smooth upper bound on ci(x) is DSfi(xi). A β-smooth upper bound
on DSf (x) is ‖DSf1(x1), . . . ,DSfn(xn)‖q′ . Also note that∥∥∥∥∥
((
yi
‖y‖p
)p−1)n
i=1
∥∥∥∥∥
q
= 1
and if p′ = p then
DSf (x) ≤
∥∥∥∥∥
((
yi
‖y‖p
)p−1)n
i=1
∥∥∥∥∥
q
·maxDSfi(xi) = maxDSfi(xi) .
Thus for p′ = p, we have maxDSfi(xi) as another β-smooth upper bound on
DSf (x). It is at least as good as the more general bound.
C Postponed Proofs
C.1 Proof of Lemma 1
First of all, a norm cannot be a constant function 0 due to the condition ‖x‖ =
0 ⇐⇒ x = 0. Let x be such that ‖x‖N = y′ for some 0 6= y′ ∈ R+. For all
y ∈ R+, we have y = yy′ · y′ = yy′ · ‖x‖N =
∥∥∥ yy′ · x∥∥∥
N
, where yy′ · x ∈ Rm.
C.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Since an ℓp-norm is defined for p ≥ 1, we may raise both sides of equation to the
power p. We use the definition of ℓp-norm and rewrite the term.
‖α1x, . . . , αkx, y1, . . . , ym‖pp =
k∑
i=1
(αix)
p +
m∑
i=1
ypi
=
(
k∑
i=1
αpi
)
· xp +
m∑
i=1
ypi
=
∥∥∥∥∥∥ p
√√√√ k∑
i=1
αpi · x, y1, . . . , ym
∥∥∥∥∥∥
p
p
.
C.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Since p, q ≥ 1, we may raise both sides of equations to the powers p or q. The
main inequalities that we use in the proof are an + bn ≤ (a+ b)n for n ≥ 1, and
an + bn ≥ (a+ b)n for n ≤ 1.
∥∥∥‖x‖q , ‖y‖q , z1, . . . , zm∥∥∥p
p
=
(
k∑
i=1
xqi
) p
q
+
(
n∑
i=1
yqi
) p
q
+
m∑
i=1
zpi
≤
(
k∑
i=1
xqi +
n∑
i=1
yqi
) p
q
+
m∑
i=1
zpi
= ‖x|y‖pq +
m∑
i=1
zpi
=
∥∥∥‖x|y‖q , z1, . . . , zm∥∥∥p
p
.
∥∥∥‖x‖p , ‖y‖p , z1, . . . , zm∥∥∥q
q
=
(
k∑
i=1
xpi
) q
p
+
(
n∑
i=1
ypi
) q
p
+
m∑
i=1
zqi
≥
(
k∑
i=1
xpi +
n∑
i=1
ypi
) q
p
+
m∑
i=1
zqi
= ‖x|y‖qp +
m∑
i=1
zqi
=
∥∥∥‖x|y‖p , z1, . . . , zm∥∥∥q
q
.
If p = q, then the inequalities in these equation arrays are equalities.
C.4 Proof of Lemma 4
By Fact 1, if p ≥ q, then ‖x‖p ≤ ‖x‖q, so it suffices to prove ‖x1, . . . , xm‖q ≤
‖y1, . . . , yn‖q. Since q ≥ 1, we may instead prove ‖x1, . . . , xm‖qq ≤ ‖y1, . . . , yn‖qq.
Assuming that there exists an injective mapping f such that |xi| ≤ |yf(i)|, we
have
‖x1, . . . , xm‖qq =
∑
i∈[m]
xqi ≤
∑
i∈[m]
yqf(i)
≤
∑
i∈[m]
yqf(i) +
∑
j∈[n]\Im(f)
yqj
= ‖y1, . . . , yn‖qq .
C.5 Proof of Lemma 5
Let ∇f(x) = (ai)ni=1. Assuming ai 6= 0 for all i (otherwise remove the indices i
for which ai = 0 from the summations containing ai):
|dfx(y)| = |∇f(x) · y| ≤
n∑
i=1
|ai||yi| =
∑
|ai|
p
p−1 · |yi|
|ai|
1
p−1
≤
≤
(∑
|ai|
p
p−1
)( ∑ |yi|p∑ |ai| pp−1
) 1
p
=
(∑
|ai|
p
p−1
) p−1
p
(∑
|yi|p
) 1
p
=
= ‖∇f(x)‖q · ‖y‖p
for all y ∈ X . The second inequality used here is the weighted power means
inequality with exponents 1 and p. Equality is achievable (and not only for
y = 0): for example, by taking yi = |ai|
1
p−1 . Thus ‖∇f(x)‖q is the smallest
value of c such that for all y, |dfx(y)| ≤ c · ‖y‖p, i.e. it is the operator norm
‖dfx‖.
The cases p = 1 and p =∞ can be achieved as limits of the general case.
C.6 Proof of Lemma 6
(a) We first prove that (V, ‖·‖V ) is a normed vector space. We prove only the
triangle inequality. The rest of the properties of norm are easy to check.
‖(v1, v2) + (v′1, v′2)‖V = ‖(v1 + v′1, v2 + v′2)‖V
= ‖(‖v1 + v′1‖V1 , ‖v2 + v′2‖V2)‖p ≤
≤ ‖(‖v1‖V1 + ‖v′1‖V1 , ‖v2‖V2 + ‖v′2‖V2)‖p ≤
≤ ‖(‖v1‖V1 , ‖v2‖V2)‖p + ‖(‖v′1‖V1 , ‖v′2‖V2)‖p =
= ‖(v1, v2)‖V + ‖(v′1, v′2)‖V
The first inequality uses the triangle inequalities of ‖·‖V1 and ‖·‖V2 and the
monotonicity of ‖·‖p in the absolute values of the coordinates of its argument
vector. The second inequality uses the triangle inequality of ‖·‖p.
Thus (V, ‖·‖V ) is a normed vector space. It remains to prove that it is com-
plete. Consider a Cauchy sequence {xn} in V . Then
∀ǫ > 0. ∃N ∈ N. ∀m,n > N. ‖xm − xn‖V < ǫ
Let xn = (yn, zn) where yn ∈ V1 and zn ∈ V2. Note that
‖ym − yn‖V1 = ‖(ym − yn, 0)‖V ≤ ‖(ym − yn, zm − zn)‖V = ‖xm − xn‖V
Thus
∀ǫ > 0. ∃N ∈ N. ∀m,n > N. ‖ym − yn‖V1 < ǫ
i.e. {yn} is a Cauchy sequence in V1. Because V1 is a Banach space, there exists
y ∈ V1 such that
lim
n→∞
‖yn − y‖V1 = 0
Similarly, we get that there exists z ∈ V2 such that
lim
n→∞
‖zn − z‖V2 = 0
Let x = (y, z). Note that
‖xn − x‖V = ‖(yn − y, zn − z)‖V = ‖(‖yn − y‖V1 , ‖zn − z‖V2)‖p
Then, because ‖ ‖p is continuous,
lim
n→∞
‖xn − x‖V = ‖( lim
n→∞
‖yn − y‖V1 , lim
n→∞
‖zn − z‖V2)‖p = ‖(0, 0)‖p = 0
Thus V is a Banach space.
(b) Let c1 = ‖dgv1‖, c2 = ‖dhv2‖. Note that
lim
x1→0V1
|g(v1 + x1)− g(v1)− dfv(x1, 0)|
‖x1‖V1
=
= lim
x1→0V1
|f(v1 + x1, v2)− f(v1, v2)− dfv(x1, 0)|
‖(x1, 0)‖V =
= lim
(x1,0)→0V
|f(v + (x1, 0))− f(v)− dfv(x1, 0)|
‖(x1, 0)‖V =
= lim
x→0V
|f(v + x)− f(v)− dfv(x)|
‖x‖V = 0
The last equality holds by the definition of Fre´chet derivative. The equality
before that holds because the limit on the right-hand side exists. Then, again
by the definition of Fre´chet derivative, we get that the linear map that maps x1
to dfv(x1, 0), is dgv1 . Thus dfv(x1, 0) = dgv1(x1). Similarly, we get dfv(0, x2) =
dhv2(x2). Now
|dfv(x1, x2)| = |dfv(x1, 0) + dfv(0, x2)| =
= |dgv1(x1) + dhv2(x2)| ≤ |dgv1(x1)|+ |dhv2(x2)| ≤
≤ c1‖x1‖V1 + c2‖x2‖V2 ≤ ‖(c1, c2)‖q · ‖(‖x1‖V1 , ‖x2‖V2)‖p =
= ‖(c1, c2)‖q · ‖(x1, x2)‖V
The last inequality follows from the weighted power means inequality, similarly
to the proof of Lemma 5. Equality is also achievable: because c1 = ‖dgv1‖ and
c2 = ‖dhv2‖, there exist x1 and x2 that achieve equality in the second inequality.
Then scale x1 and x2 by constants such that ‖x1‖V1 and ‖x2‖V2 (which scale by
the same constants) achieve equality in the third inequality. To achieve equality
in the first inequality, we may further need to multiply x1 and/or x2 by −1.
Thus ‖dfv‖ = ‖(c1, c2)‖q.
C.7 Proof of Lemma 7
N  M implies ‖x1, . . . , xn‖N ≤ ‖x1, . . . , xn‖M for any valuation x1, . . . , xn ∈
R
n. Instead of N  M , we may write N ′(V1, . . . , Vm)  M ′(V1, . . . , Vm). By
Lemma 1, each subnorm Vi is surjective, and since all these subnorms use distinct
sets of variables, we have ‖v1, . . . , vm‖N ′ ≤ ‖v1, . . . , vm‖M ′ for all valuations
(v1, . . . , vm) ∈ (R+)m.
Since αi ∈ R+, vi ∈ R+, also αivi ∈ R+. Since ‖v1, . . . , vm‖N ′ ≤ ‖v1, . . . , vm‖M ′
holds for any possible valuation of vi ∈ R+, it also holds for αivi ∈ R+. This also
holds for vi = ‖x1, . . . , xn‖Vi , so we getN ′(α1V1, . . . , αmVm) M ′(α1V1, . . . , αmVm).
C.8 Proof of Lemma 8
We prove the first inequality, and the proof would be analogous for the second
one. Consider any subnorm ‖M1, . . . ,Mk‖r of the norm N . Since p is the largest
used subnorm of N , we have ‖M1, . . . ,Mk‖r  ‖M1, . . . ,Mk‖p. Applying this
inequality to every possible subnorm of N and substituting r with p, we get a
composite norm in which all the subnorms are ‖·‖p for the same p ≥ 1. It allows
us to apply Lemma 3 and ungroup all the subnorms. We assume that all scalings
in N are applied directly to the variables. Applying ungrouping procedure recur-
sively, we finally reach the scaled variables, getting N = ‖α11x1, . . . , αmkmxm‖p,
where some variables may repeat if they were repeating in different subnorms
of N before. We may now use Lemma 2 to merge repeating variables into one,
rewriting∥∥∥∥∥∥α11x1, . . . ,
ki︷ ︸︸ ︷
αi1xi, . . . , αikixi, . . . , αmkmxm
∥∥∥∥∥∥
p
=
=
∥∥∥∥∥∥α11x1, . . . , p
√√√√ ki∑
j=1
αijxi, . . . , αmkmxm
∥∥∥∥∥∥
p
.
After doing it for all i ∈ [m], we get ‖α1x1, . . . , αmxm‖p.
C.9 Proof of Lemma 9
By Def. 12, the mapping f is β-smooth, if f(x) ≤ eβ·‖x′−x‖·f(x′) for all x, x′ ∈ X .
We may rewrite it as f(x)f(x′) ≤ eβ·‖x
′−x‖ ·f(x′). Applying ln to both sides, it suffices
to prove that ln(f(x))− ln(f(x′)) ≤ β · ‖x′ − x‖, which is ln(f(x))−ln(f(x′))‖x′−x‖ ≤ β.
Applying mean value theorem to the function ln ◦f : X → R, we get |ln(f(x))−ln(f(x
′))|
‖x′−x‖ =
‖d(ln ◦f)v‖ for some v ∈ X . Applying derivative chain rule, since ∂ ln∂x (x) = 1|x| ,
we get ‖d(ln ◦f)v‖ = ‖dfv‖|f(v)| =
DSf (v)
|f(v)| ≤ β, where the last inequality comes from
the lemma statement.
C.10 Proof of Lemma 10
We have:
1.
∣∣∣ (f(x)+g(x))′f(x)+g(x) ∣∣∣ = |f ′(x)+g′(x)||f(x)|+|g(x)| ≤ |f ′(x)|+|g′(x)||f(x)|+|g(x)| ≤
max
(∣∣∣ f ′(x)f(x) ∣∣∣ , ∣∣∣ g′(x)g(x) ∣∣∣) ≤ max(βf , βg).
2.
∣∣∣ (f(x)·g(x))′f(x)·g(x) ∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣f ′(x)·g(x)+f(x)·g′(x)f(x)·g(x) ∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣f ′(x)f(x) ∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣ g′(x)g(x) ∣∣∣ ≤ βf + βg.
3.
∣∣∣ (f(x)/g(x))′f(x)/g(x) ∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣ f ′(x)·g(x)−f(x)·g′(x)g(x)2 · g(x)f(x) ∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣ f ′(x)f(x) − g′(x)g(x) ∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣ f ′(x)f(x) ∣∣∣+∣∣∣g′(x)g(x) ∣∣∣ ≤
βf + βg.
C.11 Proof of Lemma 11
Let yi = fi(xi) and y = (y1, . . . , yn). We have
∂f
∂xi
(x) =
∂f
∂yi
(y) · ∂fi
∂xi
(xi) =
(
yi
‖y‖p
)p−1
· ∂fi
∂xi
(xi) .
Since yi‖y‖p =
fi(xi)
f(x) =
fi(xi)
‖(fi(xi))ni=1‖p
, we have fi(xi)f(x) ≤ 1, and hence also
(
fi(xi)
f(x)
)p−1
≤
1, getting ∂f∂xi (x) ≤
∂fi
∂xi
(xi).
C.12 Proof of Lemma 12
Let yj = fj(x), z =
∑n
j=1 y
p
j . We have
∂f
∂xi
(x) =
∂f
∂z
(z) ·
n∑
j=1
(
∂fj(x)
p
∂yj
(yj) · ∂fj
∂xi
(x)
)
=
n∑
j=1
(
yj
‖y‖p
)p−1
· ∂fj
∂xi
(x) =
n∑
j=1
(
fj(x)
f(x)
)p−1
· ∂fj
∂xi
(x) .
As in the proof of Lemma 11,
(
yj
‖y‖p
)p−1
=
(
fj(x)
f(x)
)p−1
≤ 1. We get ∂f∂xi (x) ≤∑n
j=1
∂fj
∂xi
(x). We can proceed with the inequality in another way.
n∑
j=1
(
fj(x)
f(x)
)p−1
· ∂fj
∂xi
(x) =
∑n
j=1 fj(x)
p−1 · ∂fj∂xi (x)
f(x)p−1
=
∑n
j=1 fj(x)
p · ∂fj∂xi (x) · 1fj(x)
f(x)p−1
≤ nmax
j=1
(
1
fj(x)
· ∂fj
∂xi
(x)
)
·
∑n
j=1 fj(x)
p
f(x)p−1
=
n
max
j=1
(
1
fj(x)
· ∂fj
∂xi
(x)
)
· f(x)
p
f(x)p−1
=
n
max
j=1
(
f(x)
fj(x)
· ∂fj
∂xi
(x)
)
.
C.13 Proof of Lemma 13
Let X =
∏n
i=1Xi and x = (x1, . . . , xn). Let β = maxi βi. By Lemma 11, an
upper bound on ∂f∂xi (x) is ci(x) = f
′
i(xi). We have
|ci(x)| = |f ′i(xi)| ≤ DSfi(xi) = |fi(xi)| ·
DSfi(xi)
|fi(xi)| ≤ |fi(xi)| · βi .
By Lemma 5 and Lemma 6, the derivative sensitivity of f in (X, ℓ p
p−1
) is
DSf (x) = ‖(c1(x), . . . , cn(x))‖p
Using inequality |fi(xi)| ≤ |f(x)|, we get
DSf (x)
|f(x)| ≤
‖(|fi(xi)| · βi)ni=1‖p
|f(x)| ≤
|f(x)| · ‖(βi)ni=1‖p
|f(x)| ≤ ‖(βi)
n
i=1‖p .
On the other hand, using inequality βi ≤ β, we get
DSf (x)
|f(x)| ≤
‖(|fi(xi)| · β)ni=1‖p
|f(x)| ≤
β · ‖(|fi(xi)|)ni=1‖p
|f(x)| = β
C.14 Proof of Lemma 14
Let X =
∏n
i=1Xi and x = (x1, . . . , xn). By Lemma 12, an upper bound on
∂f
∂xi
(x) is ci(x) = max
n
j
f(x)
fj(x)
· ∂fj∂xi (x). We have
|ci(x)| =
∣∣∣∣maxj f(x)fj(x) · ∂fj∂xi (x)
∣∣∣∣
≤ |f(x)| · nmax
j
∣∣∣∣∂fj∂xi (x) · 1fj(x)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ |f(x)| ·maxj βji .
By Lemma 5 and Lemma 6, the derivative sensitivity of f in (X, ℓ p
p−1
) is
DSf (x) = ‖(c1(x), . . . , cn(x))‖p
We get
DSf (x)
|f(x)| ≤
|f(x)| ·
∥∥∥(maxj βji )n
i=1
∥∥∥
p
|f(x)| ≤
∥∥∥∥(maxj βji )ni=1
∥∥∥∥
p
.
C.15 Proof of Theorem 4
First of all, if ‖·‖M  ‖·‖N , then ‖·‖N ′  ‖·‖M ′ for the dual norms ‖·‖N ′ ,
‖·‖M ′ . Indeed, by definition of a dual norm, ‖T ‖M ′ = sup{T (x) | ‖x‖M ≤ 1}
for an operator T from the dual space X → R. Since ‖x‖N ≤ ‖x‖B, we have ∀x :
{T (x) | ‖x‖N ≤ 1} ⊇ {T (x) | ‖x‖M ≤ 1}. Hence, ‖T ‖N ′ = sup{T (x) | ‖x‖N ≤ 1} ≥
sup{T (x) | ‖x‖M ≤ 1} = ‖T ‖N ′ .
By definition, we have DSf (x) = ‖dfx‖N ′ , where dfx is the Fre´chet derivative
of f at x and ‖·‖N ′ is the dual norm of ‖·‖N . Since ‖·‖N ′  ‖·‖M ′ , we have
‖dfx‖N ′ ≥ ‖dfx‖M ′ . Since c(x) is a β-smooth upper bound on ‖dfx‖N ′ , it is also
a β-smooth upper bound on ‖dfx‖M ′ . By Theorem 3, g(x) = f(x) + c(x)b · η is
ǫ-differentially private w.r.t. the norm ‖·‖M .
D Evaluation details
D.1 Database schema
The TPC-H testset [1] puts forth the following database schema, as given below.
The tables are (randomly) filled with a number of rows, generated by a program
that accompanies the schema. The number of rows depends on the scaling factor
SF . The tables, and the numbers of rows in them are the following:
Part: SF · 200, 000 rows.
column type
P PARTKEY identifier
P NAME text
P MFGR text
P BRAND text
P TYPE text
P SIZE integer
P CONTAINER text
P RETAILPRICE decimal
P COMMENT text
Supplier: SF · 10, 000 rows.
column type
S SUPPKEY identifier
S NAME text
S ADDRESS text
S NATIONKEY identifier
S PHONE text
S ACCTBAL decimal
S COMMENT text
Partsupp: SF · 800, 000 rows.
column type
PS PARTKEY Identifier
PS SUPPKEY Identifier
PS AVAILQTY integer
PS SUPPLYCOST decimal
PS COMMENT text
Customer: SF · 150, 000 rows.
column type
C CUSTKEY Identifier
C NAME text
C ADDRESS text
C NATIONKEY Identifier
C PHONE text
C ACCTBAL decimal
C MKTSEGMENT text
C COMMENT text
Orders: SF · 1, 500, 000 rows
column type
O ORDERKEY Identifier
O CUSTKEY Identifier
O ORDERSTATUS text
O TOTALPRICE Decimal
O ORDERDATE Date
O ORDERPRIORITY text
O CLERK text
O SHIPPRIORITY Integer
O COMMENT text
Lineitem: SF · 6, 000, 000 rows
column type
L ORDERKEY identifier
L PARTKEY identifier
L SUPPKEY identifier
L LINENUMBER integer
L QUANTITY decimal
L EXTENDEDPRICE decimal
L DISCOUNT decimal
L TAX decimal
L RETURNFLAG text
L LINESTATUS text
L SHIPDATE date
L COMMITDATE date
L RECEIPTDATE date
L SHIPINSTRUCT text
L SHIPMODE text
L COMMENT text
Nation: 25 rows
column type
N NATIONKEY identifier
N NAME text
N REGIONKEY identifier
N COMMENT text
Region: 5 rows
column type
R REGIONKEY identifier
R NAME text
R COMMENT text
D.2 Sensitive components
In all tables except Lineitem, we consider the change that is the scaled sum
of changes in all sensitive attributes. All attributes that are not a part of the
norm are considered insensitive. We assumed that textual fields as well as the
keys (ordinal data) are not sensitive.
A letter G appended to date column names (e.g. o shipdateG) denotes that
the initial date datatype has been converted to a floating-point number, which
is the number of months passed from the date 1980-01-01.
– Part: ‖p size, 0.01 · p retailprice‖1. The values of p retailprice are mea-
sured in hundreds, so we consider larger changes (i.e. make such change
causing a change of 1 in the output correspond to unit sensitivity).
– Partsupp: ‖ps availqty, 0.01 · ps supplycost‖1.
– Orders: ‖30 · o shipdateG, 0.01 · ps supplycost‖1.
– Customer: ‖0.01 · c acctbal‖1.
– Supplier: ‖0.01 · s acctbal‖1.
– Nation: no sensitive columns.
– Region: no sensitive columns.
In table Lineitem, several different norms would make sense and it is up to
the data owner to choose the “right” one. We could again add up the sensitive
attributes of a row, after suitably scaling them. But we could also think that
the three different dates would probably move rather synchronously, and it is
the maximum change among them that really matters. Hence we performed the
tests with the norm
‖l quantity, 0.0001 · l extendedprice, 50 · l discount,
30 · ‖l shipdateG, l commitdateG, l receiptdateG‖∞‖1 .
Here the values of l discount are very small (all around 0.1), so we aim to
protect the change in 0.02 units. On the other hand, l extendedprice can be
tens of thousands, and we want to capture larger changes for it. The dates are
measured in months, so we capture a change of one day.
Alternatively, we could take ‖·‖1 instead of ‖·‖∞, giving us simply the scaled
ℓ1 norm of all sensitive components. The benchmark results for the ℓ1-norm can
be found in Table 5 and Table 6. The error has not changed much compared to
Table 3 and Table 4, but for query b6 we could decrease ε. The reason is that
the most significant error is coming from date-related columns, and the queries
mostly use only of those columns, so there is no difference whether they are
related by ℓ1 or ℓ∞. The queries that used several date comparisons have large
errors in both cases.
D.3 Queries
SF = 0.1 SF = 0.5 SF = 1.0
init.query mod.query sens. init.query mod.query sens. init.query mod.query sens.
b1 1 373.96 5.77K 15.98K 866.2 27.46K 77.71K 3.68K 57.86K 168.24K
b1 2 172.31 5.76K 16.23K 834.7 28.84K 83.91K 1.78K 55.28K 159.15K
b1 3 178.63 5.9K 16.21K 882.59 29.72K 86.53K 1.87K 59.64K 162.37K
b1 4 186.06 5.84K 17.15K 925.36 29.47K 86.29K 1.87K 57.28K 164.86K
b1 5 169.82 5.82K 5.99K 837.92 29.98K 32.32K 1.68K 58.47K 61.86K
b3 214.03 136.24 474.7 782.8 759.96 2.62K 783.24 590.11 1.34K
b4 199.64 9.09K 33.5K 1.01K 49.2K 170.13K 2.07K 95.64K 346.65K
b5 141.93 308.07 2.56K 692.14 1.21K 5.1K 1.82K 2.42K 14.6K
b6 146.74 38.81K 199.67K 719.9 195.99K 959.3K 1.53K 392.06K 2.02M
b7 186.22 270.8 1.13K 941.71 1.85K 6.37K 2.37K 3.11K 13.14K
b9 216.29 153.68 5.51K 790.09 830.06 5.18K 2.58K 1.92K 11.02K
b10 163.83 173.5 573.62 829.69 857.22 2.79K 345.26 1.82K 5.99K
b12 1 249.9 17.68K 80.03K 1.24K 82.76K 385.35K 2.91K 175.21K 814.0K
b12 2 232.16 7.0K 33.81K 1.15K 33.74K 156.35K 2.62K 68.94K 329.34K
b16 50.29 216.56 274.42 155.31 1.32K 1.71K 292.41 2.47K 3.22K
b17 117.5 110.97 317.11 566.25 595.3 1.62K 1.31K 1.18K 3.36K
b19 166.16 349.24 1.13K 816.59 1.68K 5.85K 1.76K 3.34K 12.1K
Table 5. Time benchmarks (ms)
SF = 0.1 SF = 0.5 SF = 1.0
ε init.res mod.res sens. % error init.res mod.res sens. % error init.res mod.res sens. % error
b1 1 1.0 3.79M 3.55M 1.0 6.18 18.87M 17.7M 1.0 6.2 37.72M 35.38M 1.0 6.2
b1 2 1.0 5.34G 5.01G 9.96K 6.18 27.35G 25.65G 9.96K 6.2 56.57G 53.06G 9.96K 6.2
b1 3 1.0 5.07G 4.76G 11.16K 6.18 25.98G 24.37G 11.16K 6.2 53.74G 50.41G 11.16K 6.2
b1 4 1.0 5.27G 4.95G 12.06K 6.18 27.02G 25.34G 12.06K 6.2 55.89G 52.43G 12.06K 6.2
b1 5 1.0 148.3K 139.12K 0.0006 6.19 739.56K 693.7K 0.0006 6.2 1.48M 1.39M 0.0006 6.2
b3 1.0 3.62K 1.09K 7.98K 2.13K 3.21K 963.25 7.98K 2.42K 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
b4 1.0 2.92K 8.58K 0.0068 194.14 14.17K 42.89K 0.0069 202.66 28.07K 85.67K 0.0069 205.18
b5 1.0 5.43M 5.05M 4.96K 5.98 25.28M 23.82M 4.96K 5.56 47.56M 45.33M 4.96K 4.6
b6 2.5 17.45M 17.09M 48.12K 0.75 88.13M 87.69M 49.22K 0.06 181.93M 181.41M 50.45K 0.0094
b7 1.0 22.07M 22.12M 22.25K 1.24 95.63M 100.99M 22.51K 5.85 212.11M 219.31M 22.58K 3.5
b9 1.0 30.32M 30.32M 40.0K 1.32 137.73M 137.73M 49.2K 0.36 283.82M 283.82M 49.2K 0.17
b10 1.0 100.31K 111.39K 3.42K 45.15 149.6K 175.47K 3.42K 40.18 0.0 93.54K 3.31K ∞
b12 1 1.0 3.12K 9.05K 0.0014 190.47 15.41K 45.15K 0.0014 193.04 30.84K 90.3K 0.0014 192.83
b12 2 1.0 1.29K 3.65K 0.0014 183.07 6.2K 18.11K 0.0014 191.85 12.37K 36.24K 0.0014 193.01
b16 4.5 9.95K 249.44K 16.69 2.41K 49.35K 1.25M 16.69 2.44K 98.97K 2.51M 16.69 2.44K
b17 1.0 31.54K 265.49K 902.59 770.26 256.24K 1.61M 902.59 531.72 531.93K 3.53M 902.59 565.73
b19 7.0 155.25K 258.9K 28.48K 250.22 1.1M 1.52M 29.79K 65.16 1.73M 2.93M 30.59K 87.66
Table 6. Precision benchmarks
--b1_1
select
sum(lineitem.l_quantity)
from
lineitem
where
lineitem.l_shipdateG <= 230.3 - 30
and
lineitem.l_returnflag = ’R’
and
lineitem.l_linestatus = ’F’
;
--b1_2
select
sum(lineitem.l_extendedprice)
from
lineitem
where
lineitem.l_shipdateG <= 230.3 - 30
and
lineitem.l_returnflag = ’R’
and
lineitem.l_linestatus = ’F’
;
--b1_3
select
sum(lineitem.l_extendedprice*(1-lineitem.l_discount))
from
lineitem
where
lineitem.l_shipdateG <= 230.3 - 30
and
lineitem.l_returnflag = ’R’
and
lineitem.l_linestatus = ’F’
;
--b1_4
select
sum(lineitem.l_extendedprice*(1-lineitem.l_discount)
*(1+lineitem.l_tax))
from
lineitem
where
lineitem.l_shipdateG <= 230.3 - 30
and
lineitem.l_returnflag = ’R’
and
lineitem.l_linestatus = ’F’
;
--b1_5
select
count(*)
from
lineitem
where
lineitem.l_shipdateG <= 230.3 - 30
and
lineitem.l_returnflag = ’R’
and
lineitem.l_linestatus = ’F’
;
--b3
select
sum(lineitem.l_extendedprice*(1-lineitem.l_discount))
from
customer,
orders,
lineitem
where
customer.c_mktsegment = ’BUILDING’
and customer.c_custkey = orders.o_custkey
and lineitem.l_orderkey = orders.o_orderkey
and orders.o_orderdateG < 190
and lineitem.l_shipdateG > 190
and lineitem.l_orderkey = ’162’
and orders.o_shippriority = ’0’
;
--b4
select count(*)
from
orders,
lineitem
where
orders.o_orderdateG >= 180
and orders.o_orderdateG < 180 + 3
and lineitem.l_orderkey = orders.o_orderkey
and lineitem.l_commitdateG < lineitem.l_receiptdateG
and orders.o_orderpriority = ’1-URGENT’
;
--b5
select sum(lineitem.l_extendedprice*(1-lineitem.l_discount))
from
customer,
orders,
lineitem,
supplier,
nation,
region
where
customer.c_custkey = orders.o_custkey
and lineitem.l_orderkey = orders.o_orderkey
and lineitem.l_suppkey = supplier.s_suppkey
and customer.c_nationkey = supplier.s_nationkey
and supplier.s_nationkey = nation.n_nationkey
and nation.n_regionkey = region.r_regionkey
and region.r_name = ’ASIA’
and orders.o_orderdateG >= 213.3
and orders.o_orderdateG < 213.3 + 12
and nation.n_name = ’JAPAN’
;
--b6
select
sum(lineitem.l_extendedprice * lineitem.l_discount)
from
lineitem
where
lineitem.l_shipdateG >= 170.5
and lineitem.l_shipdateG < 170.5 + 12
and lineitem.l_discount between 0.09 - 0.01
and 0.09 + 0.01
and lineitem.l_quantity < 24
;
--b7
select
sum(lineitem.l_extendedprice * (1 - lineitem.l_discount))
from
supplier,
lineitem,
orders,
customer,
nation as n1,
nation as n2
where
supplier.s_suppkey = lineitem.l_suppkey
and orders.o_orderkey = lineitem.l_orderkey
and customer.c_custkey = orders.o_custkey
and supplier.s_nationkey = n1.n_nationkey
and customer.c_nationkey = n2.n_nationkey
and (
(n1.n_name = ’JAPAN’ and n2.n_name = ’INDONESIA’)
or (n1.n_name = ’INDONESIA’ and n2.n_name = ’JAPAN’)
)
and lineitem.l_shipdateG between 182.6 and 207
;
--b9
select
sum(lineitem.l_extendedprice*(1-lineitem.l_discount)
- partsupp.ps_supplycost*lineitem.l_quantity)
from
part,
supplier,
lineitem,
partsupp,
orders,
nation
where
supplier.s_suppkey = lineitem.l_suppkey
and partsupp.ps_suppkey = lineitem.l_suppkey
and partsupp.ps_partkey = lineitem.l_partkey
and part.p_partkey = lineitem.l_partkey
and orders.o_orderkey = lineitem.l_orderkey
and supplier.s_nationkey = nation.n_nationkey
and part.p_name like ’%violet%’
and nation.n_name = ’UNITED KINGDOM’
;
--b10
select
sum(lineitem.l_extendedprice * (1 - lineitem.l_discount))
from
customer,
orders,
lineitem,
nation
where
customer.c_custkey = orders.o_custkey
and lineitem.l_orderkey = orders.o_orderkey
and orders.o_orderdateG >= 183.3
and orders.o_orderdateG < 183.3 + 3
and lineitem.l_returnflag = ’R’
and customer.c_nationkey = nation.n_nationkey
and customer.c_custkey = ’64’
and nation.n_name = ’CANADA’
;
--b12_1
select
count(*)
from
orders,
lineitem
where
orders.o_orderkey = lineitem.l_orderkey
and (orders.o_orderpriority <> ’1-URGENT’
or orders.o_orderpriority <> ’2-HIGH’)
and lineitem.l_shipmode in (’TRUCK’, ’SHIP’)
and lineitem.l_commitdateG < lineitem.l_receiptdateG
and lineitem.l_shipdateG < lineitem.l_commitdateG
and lineitem.l_receiptdateG >= 183.3
and lineitem.l_receiptdateG < 183.3 + 12
;
--b12_2
select
count(*)
from
orders,
lineitem
where
orders.o_orderkey = lineitem.l_orderkey
and (orders.o_orderpriority = ’1-URGENT’
or orders.o_orderpriority = ’2-HIGH’)
and lineitem.l_shipmode in (’TRUCK’, ’SHIP’)
and lineitem.l_commitdateG < lineitem.l_receiptdateG
and lineitem.l_shipdateG < lineitem.l_commitdateG
and lineitem.l_receiptdateG >= 183.3
and lineitem.l_receiptdateG < 183.3 + 12
;
--b16
select count(partsupp.ps_suppkey)
from
partsupp,
part,
supplier
where
part.p_partkey = partsupp.ps_partkey
and partsupp.ps_suppkey = supplier.s_suppkey
and part.p_brand <> ’Brand#34’
and not (part.p_type like ’%COPPER%’)
and part.p_size in (5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40)
and not (supplier.s_comment like ’%Customer%Complaints%’)
and part.p_brand = ’Brand#14’
and part.p_type = ’LARGE ANODIZED TIN’
;
--b17
select
sum(lineitem.l_extendedprice * 0.142857)
from
lineitem,
part
where
part.p_partkey = lineitem.l_partkey
and part.p_brand = ’Brand#34’
and part.p_container = ’JUMBO PKG’
and lineitem.l_quantity < 0.2 * 32
;
--b19
select
sum(lineitem.l_extendedprice*(1-lineitem.l_discount))
from
lineitem,
part
where
part.p_partkey = lineitem.l_partkey
and lineitem.l_shipmode in (’AIR’, ’AIR REG’)
and lineitem.l_shipinstruct = ’DELIVER IN PERSON’
and part.p_size >= 1
and
((
part.p_brand = ’Brand#34’
and part.p_container in (’SM CASE’, ’SM BOX’,
’SM PACK’, ’SM PKG’)
and lineitem.l_quantity >= 35
and lineitem.l_quantity <= 35 + 10
and part.p_size <= 5
)
or
(
part.p_brand = ’Brand#22’
and part.p_container in (’MED BAG’, ’MED BOX’,
’MED PKG’, ’MED PACK’)
and lineitem.l_quantity >= 12
and lineitem.l_quantity <= 12 + 10
and part.p_size <= 10
)
or
(
part.p_brand = ’Brand#14’
and part.p_container in (’LG CASE’, ’LG BOX’,
’LG PACK’, ’LG PKG’)
and lineitem.l_quantity >= 90
and lineitem.l_quantity <= 90 + 10
and part.p_size <= 15
));
D.4 Examples of analyser output
We give some examples of shorter queries that have been output by the analyser.
Query b1 1
Modified query.
SELECT sum((lineitem.l_quantity * (exp((0.1 * (200.3 + ((-1.0) * lineitem.l_shipdateG))))
/ (exp((0.1 * (200.3 + ((-1.0) * lineitem.l_shipdateG)))) + 1.0))))
FROM lineitem WHERE (lineitem.l_linestatus = ’F’) AND (lineitem.l_returnflag
= ’R’);
Sensitivity query.
SELECT max(abs(sdsg)) FROM
(SELECT sum(abs(greatest(abs((exp((0.1 * (200.3 + ((-1.0) * lineitem.l_shipdateG))))
/ (exp((0.1 * (200.3 + ((-1.0) * lineitem.l_shipdateG)))) + 1.0))),
abs(case when ((((0.1 * exp((0.1 * (200.3 + ((-1.0) * lineitem.l_shipdateG)))))
/ ((exp((0.1 * (200.3 + ((-1.0) * lineitem.l_shipdateG)))) + 1.0) ^
2.0)) * 0.03) = 0.0) then 0.0 else ((((0.1 * exp((0.1 * (200.3 + ((-1.0)
* lineitem.l_shipdateG))))) / ((exp((0.1 * (200.3 + ((-1.0) * lineitem.l_shipdateG))))
+ 1.0) ^ 2.0)) * 0.03) * case when (abs(lineitem.l_quantity) >= 10.0)
then abs(lineitem.l_quantity) else (exp(((0.1 * abs(lineitem.l_quantity))
- 1.0)) / 0.1) end) end)))) AS sdsg FROM lineitem, lineitem_sensRows
WHERE
((lineitem.l_linestatus = ’F’) AND(lineitem.l_returnflag = ’R’) AND
lineitem_sensRows.ID = lineitem.ID) AND lineitem_sensRows.sensitive
GROUP BY lineitem_sensRows.ID) AS sub;
Query b1 5
Modified query.
SELECT sum(abs((exp((0.1 * (200.3 + ((-1.0) *
lineitem.l_shipdateG)))) / (exp((0.1 * (200.3 + ((-1.0) * lineitem.l_shipdateG))))
+ 1.0)))) FROM lineitem WHERE (lineitem.l_linestatus = ’F’) AND (lineitem.l_returnflag
= ’R’);
Sensitivity query.
SELECT max(sdsg) FROM (SELECT sum(abs((((0.1 * exp((0.1 * (200.3 +
((-1.0) * lineitem.l_shipdateG))))) / ((exp((0.1 * (200.3 + ((-1.0)
* lineitem.l_shipdateG)))) + 1.0) ^ 2.0)) * 0.03))) AS sdsg FROM lineitem,
lineitem_sensRows WHERE ((lineitem.l_linestatus = ’F’)
AND (lineitem.l_returnflag = ’R’) AND lineitem_sensRows.ID = lineitem.ID)
AND lineitem_sensRows.sensitive GROUP BY lineitem_sensRows.ID) AS sub;
Query b16
Modified query.
SELECT sum(abs(((((((((2.0 / (exp(((-0.1) * (part.p_size - 10.0)))
+ exp((0.1 * (part.p_size - 10.0))))) + (2.0 / (exp(((-0.1) * (part.p_size
- 15.0))) + exp((0.1 * (part.p_size - 15.0)))))) + (2.0 / (exp(((-0.1)
* (part.p_size - 20.0))) + exp((0.1 * (part.p_size - 20.0)))))) + (2.0
/ (exp(((-0.1) * (part.p_size - 25.0))) + exp((0.1 * (part.p_size -
25.0)))))) + (2.0 / (exp(((-0.1) * (part.p_size - 30.0))) + exp((0.1
* (part.p_size - 30.0)))))) + (2.0 / (exp(((-0.1) * (part.p_size - 35.0)))
+ exp((0.1 * (part.p_size - 35.0)))))) + (2.0 / (exp(((-0.1) * (part.p_size
- 40.0))) + exp((0.1 * (part.p_size - 40.0)))))) + (2.0 / (exp(((-0.1)
* (part.p_size - 5.0))) + exp((0.1 * (part.p_size - 5.0)))))))) FROM
part, partsupp, supplier WHERE not((supplier.s_comment LIKE ’%Customer%Complaints%’))
AND not((part.p_type LIKE ’%COPPER%’)) AND
not((part.p_brand = ’Brand#34’)) AND (part.p_partkey = partsupp.ps_partkey)
AND
(partsupp.ps_suppkey = supplier.s_suppkey);
Sensitivity query.
SELECT max(sdsg) FROM (SELECT sum(abs((((((((((0.1 * (2.0 / (exp(((-0.1)
* (part.p_size - 10.0))) + exp((0.1 * (part.p_size - 10.0)))))) * 8.0)
+ ((0.1 * (2.0 / (exp(((-0.1) * (part.p_size - 15.0))) + exp((0.1 *
(part.p_size - 15.0)))))) * 8.0)) + ((0.1 * (2.0 / (exp(((-0.1) * (part.p_size
- 20.0))) + exp((0.1 * (part.p_size - 20.0)))))) * 8.0)) + ((0.1 * (2.0
/ (exp(((-0.1) * (part.p_size - 25.0))) + exp((0.1 * (part.p_size -
25.0)))))) * 8.0)) + ((0.1 * (2.0 / (exp(((-0.1) * (part.p_size - 30.0)))
+ exp((0.1 * (part.p_size - 30.0)))))) * 8.0)) + ((0.1 * (2.0 / (exp(((-0.1)
* (part.p_size - 35.0))) + exp((0.1 * (part.p_size - 35.0)))))) * 8.0))
+ ((0.1 * (2.0 / (exp(((-0.1) * (part.p_size - 40.0))) + exp((0.1 *
(part.p_size - 40.0)))))) * 8.0)) + ((0.1 * (2.0 / (exp(((-0.1) * (part.p_size
- 5.0))) + exp((0.1 * (part.p_size - 5.0)))))) * 8.0)))) AS sdsg FROM
part, partsupp, supplier, part_sensRows WHERE (not((supplier.s_comment
LIKE ’%Customer%Complaints%’)) AND not((part.p_type LIKE ’%COPPER%’))
AND not((part.p_brand = ’Brand#34’)) AND (part.p_partkey = partsupp.ps_partkey)
AND (partsupp.ps_suppkey = supplier.s_suppkey) AND part_sensRows.ID
= part.ID) AND part_sensRows.sensitive GROUP BY part_sensRows.ID) AS
sub;
